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I. Introduction
One of the primary objectives of zoning is the protection of
the tranquility and family atmosphere of residential neighbor-
hoods.' Religious and educational institutions are examples of
uses which exist for the benefit of the public and which must, in
most instances, exist in the residential areas which they serve.2
The expanding concept of what is considered to be a religious
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1. The legitimacy of the promotion of the integrity of single-family residential dis-
tricts was emphatically endorsed in the often quoted language of Justice Douglas in Vil-
lage of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974):
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs .... The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places.
It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of
quiet seclusion and clean air make a sanctuary for people.
2. "Quite apart from tradition and aesthetics, no facility is more appropriately lo-
cated in residential districts than a church from a viewpoint of its own effective function-
ing." 3A N. WILLIAMs, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 77.01 (1985).
1
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activity, coupled with the ever-increasing intensity and hours of
utilization of school facilities, often produces impacts which in-
terfere with the tranquility sought in residential neighborhoods.'
Nevertheless, the New York courts have uniformly held that res-
idents must tolerate such minor inconvenience in order to ac-
commodate the higher public benefit promoted by such institu-
tions.4 A religious or educational use may be excluded only in
those rare instances where it is demonstrated to be dangerous to
the surrounding area or decisively contrary to the public health,
safety, or welfare.' Otherwise, the zoning power is generally con-
fined to minimizing the undesirable impacts of the use.'
This Article will analyze what uses qualify for the preferred
treatment accorded religious and educational uses and the de-
gree to which otherwise legitimate concerns must yield to the
limited immunity accorded these uses. In order to understand
the often competing interests of the two potential protagonists,
this Article will review the historical progression of decisions
whereby municipal regulation of religious and educational uses
was virtually eliminated. The initial emergence of a less deferen-
tial standard will be examined wherein a number of dissents
have suggested that planning concerns and the desire to estab-
lish or expand religious and educational uses be balanced. Last,
this Article will evaluate the recent revision of applicable stan-
dards whereby municipalities may require churches and schools
to mitigate the undesirable consequences of their operations
and, if such uses are dangerous to the public welfare, may ex-
clude them from the municipality.
A. Background
Religious and educational institutions have historically en-
joyed preferred status in New York and have been permitted to
exist or to expand relatively unhindered in residential neighbor-
hoods. The court of appeals has determined that "churches and
3. See N.Y. Times, July 27, 1986, § 8, at 7, col. 1.
4. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
5. Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 595, 503 N.E.2d 509, 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d
861, 867 (1986).
6. Id. at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 515-16, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
7. See id. at 593, 503 N.E.2d at 513, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
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schools occupy a different status from mere commercial enter-
prises and, when the church enters the picture, different consid-
erations apply."' This dominant status is based on a recognition
that religious and educational institutions are, by their very na-
ture, beneficial to the public welfare.' Since zoning laws may be
enacted only in furtherance of the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare, 10 and such uses of property are presumed to
be in furtherance of the general welfare of the community, the
preferred status of churches" and schools "severely limits the
permissible reach of zoning restrictions . . . ."I In addition, the
constitutionally protected role in society of religious institutions
further curtails the authority of local governments to enforce
zoning regulations against churches. Accordingly, until Cornell
University v. Bagnardi,'s the prevailing opinion was that "the
general policy, as applied in this State, is that religious [and
educational] institutions are virtually immune from zoning re-
strictions.""' In Bagnardi, however, the court of appeals deter-
mined that the controlling consideration in reviewing a request
of a school or church to locate in a residential area must be the
overall impact of the use on the welfare of the community.'" Es-
chewing the perceived meaning of prior decisions, the court de-
termined that "[t]here is simply no conclusive presumption that
any religious or educational use automatically outweighs its ill
effects."'"
8. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 523, 136 N.E.2d 827, 834, 154
N.Y.S.2d 849, 859 (1956) (citation omitted).
9. "Thus church and school and accessory uses are, in themselves, clearly in further-
ance of the public morals and general welfare." Id. at 526, 136 N.E.2d at 836-37, 154
N.Y.S.2d at 862.
10. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
11. For the sake of convenience, the word "church" is frequently used herein to
include within its meaning churches, synagogues, mosques, or any other edifice for the
conducting of bona fide religious services of any nature.
12. Rhema Christian Fellowship v. Common Council of Buffalo, 114 Misc. 2d 710,
711, 452 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1982).
13. 68 N.Y.2d 583, 503 N.E.2d 509, 510 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1986).
14. Bright Horizon House, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121 Misc. 2d 703, 710, 469
N.Y.S.2d 851, 856 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1983).
15. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
16. Id. See also Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the North Shore, Inc. v. In-
corporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 292, 342 N.E.2d 534, 542, 379
N.Y.S.2d 747, 756 (1975) (Breitel, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976)
(citations omitted).
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While such institutions were initially welcomed by the
neighbors they served, "the advent of the automobile, as well as
the growth and diversification of religious and educational insti-
tutions, brought a host of new problems.' 7 Church activities are
no longer confined to the traditional weekly service and other
occasional religious observances. Religious institutions today are
performing a variety of social, humanitarian, and educational
functions. Consequently, the problems generated by churches
have grown with the increased involvement of such institutions
in the community. 18 As a result, "[tihey .. .bring congestion;
they generate traffic and create parking problems; they can
cause a deterioration of property values in a residential zone; in
consequence of customary exemption from taxation they work
an economic disadvantage to taxable properties."' 9
Similarly, the presence of educational institutions in resi-
dential areas frequently produces adverse effects on the neigh-
borhood and may impair the residents' enjoyment of their
homes.
Schools, like other places in which people are assembled in large
numbers, produce effects such as noise, traffic congestion and at-
tendant hazards to safety. Such conditions may be expected to
have a tendency to disrupt the peace and quiet of a residential
neighborhood and tend to cause a depreciation of property
values.' 0
Moreover, it has been observed that the level of activity in most
schools reaches far higher intensity than is normal in connection
with similar uses, such as churches, and that such activities con-
tinue for many more hours per week."' In addition to the often
obtrusive effects on the neighborhood of community schools,
"[s]prawling universities brought increased traffic and other un-
17. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 593, 503 N.E.2d at 513, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
18. "To the extent that the churches are developing more programs of activities
throughout the week, this problem (traffic generation and noise) is no longer restricted to
the traditional Sunday morning, or Friday evening-Saturday morning." N. WILLIAMS,
supra note 2, at § 77.01.
19. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, 38 N.Y.2d at 295, 342 N.E.2d at 541, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Jones, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
20. Brandeis School v. Village of Lawrence, 18 Misc. 2d 550, 558, 184 N.Y.S.2d 687,
695 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
21. N. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at § 67.01.
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expected inconveniences to their neighbors, while the benefits
these universities conferred were becoming less relevant to the
residents of the immediately surrounding areas."22
As a result of such impacts, neighbors began to view such
uses as intrusions on their domestic peace and tranquility. In
response to unsubstantiated excuses profferred by boards re-
jecting the applications of such institutions, the courts were re-
quired to exert their authority to protect such socially beneficial
uses from community fear and hostility. 3 While there is no
question that applications for religious and educational uses fre-
quently invoke legitimate planning and municipal concerns, the
decisions demonstrate that judicial concern with subterfuge by
reviewing agencies is not totally unwarranted.2 4 The difficulty, of
course, is a product of having to determine which concerns are
legally permissible and which are merely excuses for impermissi-
ble exclusion of legitimate religious and educational uses.
Municipal attempts at exclusion of religious and educational
uses may take any of several forms.2 The first, an express provi-
sion specifying churches or schools as a prohibited use in a par-
ticular residential district or omitting churches or schools as a
permitted use within a district,2" was promptly rejected by the
state's courts. 7 Accordingly, a zoning ordinance may not exclude
places of worship or educational institutions from a municipal-
ity28 and may not exclude them from any of its residential
zones. 9 Similarly, a municipality may not control the precise
spot at which a church or school is to be located and may not
22. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 593, 503 N.E.2d at 513, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
23. See id. at 593, 503 N.E.2d at 513-14, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 865-66.
24. See infra notes 167-174 and accompanying text.
25. See 2 A.H. RATHKOPF & D.A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §
20.01[1] (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter RATHKOPF].
26. Id.
27. Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d at 522, 136 N.E.2d at 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 858;
North Shore Unitarian Soc'y, Inc. v. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 525, 109
N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1951).
28. North Shore Unitarian Soc'y, 200 Misc. at 525, 109 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
29. Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d at 522, 136 N.E.2d at 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
See also Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 594, 503 N.E.2d at 514, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 866 ("[As a
result] of the inherently beneficial nature of churches and schools to the public,... total
exclusion . . . from a residential [zone] serves no end that is reasonably related to the
[promotion of] the morals, health, welfare or safety of the community."); North Shore
Unitarian Soc'y, 200 Misc. at 525, 109 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
19881
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
require such an applicant to demonstrate that a particular site is
the most appropriate location for the use."
The second exclusionary device which has been employed is
the authorization of the establishment of a church or school
upon the granting of a special permit, predicated on standards
or conditions with which they cannot practically comply. 1 "The
purpose of requiring a special permit for a church [or school] is
derived from an understanding of the invalidity of total exclu-
sion of [such uses] from residential districts coupled with a reali-
zation of the impact which a church [or school] may have upon
other property in the district."32 The court of appeals has recog-
nized that
[tihe requirement of a special permit application, which entails
disclosure of site plans, parking facilities, and other features of
the institution's proposed use, is beneficial in that it affords zon-
ing boards an opportunity to weigh the proposed use in relation
to neighboring land uses and to cushion any adverse effects by
the imposition of conditions designed to mitigate them.3
By requiring such a review, the permit may be conditioned upon
the effect the use would have on traffic congestion, property val-
ues, municipal services, the general plan for the development of
the community, and such other concerns that relate to the
health, safety, and welfare of the community "to the same ex-
tent that they may be imposed on noneducational applicants." '
While a zoning ordinance may subject a proposed religious
or educational use to the requirement of a special permit, the
reviewing agency may deny the special permit (or any other ap-
proval) only if the use will be inarguably contrary to the public
health, safety, or welfare, or be dangerous to the surrounding
area.35 Considerations such as noise, traffic, inconvenience to
30. Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 458, 136 N.E.2d 488, 496, 154
N.Y.S.2d 15, 26 (1956).
31. See RATHKOPF, supra note 25, at § 20.0111].
32. Id. at § 20.0114].
33. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 516, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (citation
omitted).
34. Id. at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867. Cf. Westchester Reform
Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 494, 239 N.E.2d 891, 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 302 (1968)
(In order to substantiate the denial of a permit for a religious institution, "it must be
[Vol. 8:1
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neighbors, and the effect on property values which cannot be
characterized as constituting a danger to the community, are in-
sufficient to justify the denial of a permit for a religious or edu-
cational use.36 These considerations, however, may be examined,
insofar as practicable, in order to minimize the effects of the use
on neighboring properties or traffic.37 Because there exists the
potential for utilizing legitimate considerations to deny a permit
for an unpopular use or organization when no factual basis ex-
ists, when a permit is denied, courts will carefully examine the
record and the reasons advanced for the presence or absence of
factual support.38 The record must contain expert testimony or
"hard evidence"39 to substantiate the denial of a permit. Specu-
lation and fear are clearly insufficient to satisfy the stricter scru-
tiny applied to zoning restrictions on such socially beneficial
uses. 0 While appropriate conditions may be imposed in order to
mitigate adverse impacts of a church or school, the conditions
will be considered to be invalid if they impose an excessively
heavy financial burden on the organization,41 that is, if "by their
cost, magnitude or volume, [they] operate indirectly to exclude
such uses altogether." ' It is also impermissible to require an ap-
convincingly shown that the Temple's proposed expansion will have a direct and imme-
diate adverse effect upon the health, safety or welfare of the community.").
36. Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d at 523-25, 136 N.E.2d at 834-37, 154 N.Y.S.2d at
859-62.
37. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867; Westches-
ter Reform Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04.
38. See American Friends of the Soc'y of St. Pius, Inc. v. Schwab, 68 A.D.2d 646,
649, 417 N.Y.S.2d 991, 993 (2d Dep't 1979). "[W]here the establishment of the church is
dependent upon the action of a local administrative body, the court's obligation is to
scrutinize carefully the reasons advanced for denial of the permit." RATHKOPF, supra
note 25, at § 20.01[4].
39. North Shore Hebrew Academy v. Wegman, 105 A.D.2d 702, 705, 481 N.Y.S.2d
142, 145 (2d Dep't 1984).
40. See North Shore Hebrew Academy, 105 A.D.2d at 705-06, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 145
(use of a private religious school as a performing arts center allowed where town failed to
provide substantial evidence establishing harm to the neighborhood); Mikveh of South
Shore Congregation, Inc. v. Granito, 78 A.D.2d 855, 432 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (2d Dep't
1980).
41. Westchester Reform Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d
at 304.
42. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 516, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (citation
omitted). Cf. Westchester Reform Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 897, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 304 (Conditions may be imposed on the granting of a special permit in order
to mitigate against the undesirable impacts of the use on the community requiring a
7
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plicant, as a condition of a special permit, to demonstrate the
necessity of its desire to expand or the need to expand at its
chosen location.43
A third exclusionary technique which has been utilized to
inhibit the establishment and expansion of religious and educa-
tional institutions is the requirement that they comply with the
same parking, yard, lot coverage, height, and other bulk regula-
tions provided for residences in the same district, the effect of
which is to prevent or curtail the proposed use of the property."'
The New York courts, however, have held that the inability to
grant variances from parking and other bulk requirements which
apply to such uses will render a zoning ordinance unconstitu-
tional.4 5 Rather than deny a requested variance, a zoning board
of appeals is required to suggest measures to accommodate a
proposed religious or educational use."6 Significantly, it has re-
cently been determined that a religious institution is excused
from the requirement of demonstrating practical difficulty as a
prerequisite to obtaining an area variance. 7 Moreover, a zoning
ordinance is unreasonable and invalid if it effects an exclusion of
an educational use by requiring the applicant to obtain a use
variance and to prove "unnecessary hardship" as a condition of
its use of property for an educational purpose.48
In order to fully comprehend the parameters of municipal
zoning authority over religious and educational uses, the dimen-
sions of the "exemption" from such regulations, and the signifi-
cance of the Bagnardi decision, the judicial response to zoning
provisions regulating and restricting such publicly beneficial
uses must be examined. In reviewing these decisions, it becomes
"modest increase in expenditures," but the imposition of conditions requiring "heavy
financial burden" may be considered to be invalid.).
43. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 597, 503 N.E.2d at 516, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
44. See RATHKOPF, supra note 25, at § 20.01[1].
45. See Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, 38 N.Y.2d at 289, 342 N.E.2d at 539,
379 N.Y.S.2d at 754; North Shore Hebrew Academy, 105 A.D.2d at 706, 481 N.Y.S.2d at
146.
46. Islamic Soc'y of Westchester and Rockland, Inc. v. Foley, 96 A.D.2d 536, 537,
464 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (2d Dep't 1983).
47. Sephardic Community of New Rochelle/Scarsdale v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 1986, at 15, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1986).
48. Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 107 A.D.2d 398, 400, 486 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966 (3d Dep't
1985), modified, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 503 N.E.2d 509, 510 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1986). See infra notes
365-383 and accompanying text.
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apparent that the initial judicial response and the thrust of most
decisions demonstrate a suspicion of municipal motives and a
concern with municipal efforts to inhibit or exclude the estab-
lishment of such uses.' 9 Since many courts came to interpret the
state of the law as requiring a "full exemption" from zoning reg-
ulations for all educational and church uses, later cases illustrate
municipal frustration at being rendered "powerless in the face of
a religious or educational institution's proposed expansion, no
matter how offensive, overpowering or unsafe to a residential
neighborhood the use might be." 5 While the courts continued to
require zoning authorities to subordinate planning concerns in
order to accommodate almost any use which could be construed
as furthering an institution's religious or educational function,
no matter how obtrusive, some jurists began to voice concern
with such an absolutist policy."1 Such frustrations and concerns,
in turn, resulted in a re-evaluation of the proper method of bal-
ancing the needs and rights of religious and educational institu-
tions and the responsibilities of municipalities. As a result,
Bagnardi determined that the presumption that educational and
religious uses are always in furtherance of the public welfare
may be rebutted by demonstrating that the proposed uses may
actually have a "net negative impact" on the community. 2
II. Religion Cases
A. Federal Court Review of First Amendment Implications
The primary distinction between the treatment of educa-
tional and religious uses relates to the additional impediment on
the exercise of local zoning authority as the result of the first
amendment free exercise implications of governmental restric-
tions on religious institutions. Among the preeminent precepts
of the United States and New York Constitutions is the guaran-
49. See infra notes 167-174 and accompanying text.
50. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 594, 503 N.E.2d at 514, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
51. See Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, 38 N.Y.2d at 292, 342 N.E.2d at 541,
379 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Jones, J., dissenting); id. at 291, 342 N.E.2d at 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
756 (Breitel, C.J., concurring); Schwab, 68 A.D.2d at 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994 (Suozzi, J.,
dissenting).
52. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 589, 503 N.E.2d at 511, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
1988]
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teed protection of the free exercise of religion. 3 Although the
United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, the
federal courts are considerably more deferential to municipal ex-
clusion of religious uses from residential areas and regulation of
such uses, than are the New York courts.54 It has been suggested
that the federal courts have applied the free exercise analysis "in
a manner that is so restrictive as to effectively exclude land use
regulations from the scope of the free exercise clause."55 These
decisions have, in effect, concluded that the "burdens imposed
upon religious practices by zoning ... laws are not ... the sort
of religious burdens that merit constitutional protection." 6 In
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v.
City of Lakewood,57 for example, the sixth circuit determined
that the free exercise clause did not bar a zoning law's exclusion
of churches from residential neighborhoods." Similarly, the
eleventh circuit determined in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach5"
that the application of a zoning ordinance to prohibit the use of
a single-family residence by its owners for organized religious
services did not violate the first amendment.60 Lastly, in Congre-
gation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo,61 a
district court, denying injunctive relief, indicated that a religious
school was subject to municipal requirements for site-plan ap-
proval, the securing of a certificate of occupancy, safety inspec-
tions, and compliance with the New York State Uniform Fire
Prevention and Building Code. 2
In Lakewood Congregation,3 a Jehovah's Witnesses congre-
53. U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
54. See infra notes 63-125 and accompanying text.
55. Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1562, 1564 (1984).
56. Id.
57. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
58. Id. at 309.
59. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 727 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
60. Id. at 741.
61. 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
62. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 600.1-1400.14 (1983).
63. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983). For a criticism of
the application of free exercise analysis in Lakewood, see Comment, Zoning Ordinances
Affecting Churches: A Proposal For Expanded Free Exercise Protection, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1131 (1984).
[Vol. 8:1
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gation challenged a zoning ordinance's exclusion of churches
from most residential districts in the city. 4 The court began its
analysis of the applicable standard of review by observing that
"[i]f the ordinance does infringe the Congregation's first amend-
ment right, the city must justify the ordinance by a compelling
governmental interest.""5 If, on the other hand, no first amend-
ment infringement is imposed, the court is required to deter-
mine whether the congregation is denied the right to use its
property without due process. Utilizing the due process standard
first enunciated in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,"6 a
zoning regulation will be sustained if it is reasonable and sub-
stantially related to concerns of public welfare. 7
The extent to which government imposes an economic bur-
den on the exercise of religious freedom is the determinant of
the infringement.66 A regulation which merely makes one's reli-
gious observance more expensive does not infringe on an indi-
vidual's freedom of exercise since "[i]nconvenient economic bur-
dens on religious freedom do not rise to a constitutionally
impermissible infringement of free exercise."6 While religious
beliefs are absolutely protected by the Constitution from gov-
ernment infringement, "[p]ractices flowing from religious beliefs
merit protection [only] when they are shown to be integrally re-
lated to the underlying beliefs." 0
Applying such analysis to determine whether the zoning or-
dinance impermissibly infringed on the congregation's free exer-
64. 699 F.2d at 305 (zones in which church buildings were not permitted comprised
ninety percent of city's total land area).
65. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
66. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
67. Id. at 395.
68. "As a general rule, the greater the cost of practicing one's religion, the more
probable that the statute creates an unconstitutional infringement." Lakewood, Ohio
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th
Cir. 1983).
69. Id. at 306 (citing Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607).
70. Id. "The centrality of the burdened religious observance to the believer's faith
influences the determination of an infringement. Religious observances in the form of
beliefs are absolutely protected from governmental infringement." Id. (citing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)). See also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218; Heffron v. Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 653 (1981); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
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cise of religion, the court was required to evaluate the nature of
the religious observation and identify the nature of the burden
placed on the religious observance. 1 The court found that the
"infringed" activity - the construction of a church build-
ing - had no religious or ritualistic significance for Jehovah's
Witnesses; it was "not a fundamental tenet of the Congrega-
tion's religious beliefs. ' 71 The restrictions of the zoning law did
not prohibit the members of the congregation from practicing
their faith in homes, schools, or churches elsewhere in the city.73
The court characterized the burdens imposed as merely consti-
tuting "an indirect financial burden and a subjective aesthetic
burden. ' 74 The ordinance did not, in the opinion of the court,
pressure the congregation in any way to abandon its beliefs or
observances. 78 Although the regulation permitted the construc-
tion of churches in only ten percent of the municipality, and lots
in those areas might be beyond the economic means of the con-
gregation or fail to satisfy the members' aesthetic tastes, "the
First Amendment does not require the City to make all land or
even the cheapest or most beautiful land available to
churches. ' 76 Since the ordinance merely regulated secular activi-
ties and may have made the practice of religious beliefs some-
what more expensive, the court found no free exercise
infringement. 77
Since the court found no religious infringement, the consti-
tutionality of the regulation was evaluated by the due process
standards of Euclid.7 8 The ordinance easily satisfied the Euclid
71. Lakewood Congregation, 699 F.2d at 306.
72. Id. at 307. "At most the Congregation can claim that its freedom to worship is
tangentially related to worshipping in its own structure." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 307-08. "It does not pressure the Congregation to abandon its religious
beliefs through financial or criminal penalties." Id. at 307.
78. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme
Court held zoning ordinances to be a legitimate exercise of a municipality's police power
if not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare." Id. at 395. Recognizing a presumption of va-
lidity of a zoning law, the Court also held that "[tihe inclusion of a reasonable margin to
insure effective enforcement, will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of inva-
lidity." Id. at 388-89.
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standard since the objectives of the law, controlling traffic con-
gestion and off-street parking, were not "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare." 9
In a decision involving a similar dispute, the eleventh circuit
also rejected contentions that municipal objectives promoted by
a zoning law did not outweigh the burden imposed upon the free
exercise of religion. In Grosz v. City of Miami Beach,80 the court
upheld the application of a zoning law to bar the use of an acces-
sory building for conducting religious services in a district zoned
exclusively for single-family residential use.8 The city zoning
law permitted churches, synagogues, and other religious institu-
tions in every other zoning district, comprising fifty percent of
the city's residential area.82  Although daily services rarely
caused a substantial disturbance to the neighborhood, large ser-
vices did annoy the neighbors.83
Observing that the "doctrinal centerpiece" of free exercise
analysis is the balancing of competing governmental and reli-
gious interests, the court opined that governmental action must
first satisfy two threshold tests before such balancing is permit-
ted. The court found that the zoning. regulation satisfied the
first test, which required that the governmental action did not
regulate religious beliefs, but involved only conduct. 5 The zon-
ing law also satisfied the second threshold test, that a law have
both a secular purpose86 and a secular effect. 7
79. Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 308 (quoting Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395).
80. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 727 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
81. The plaintiff, a rabbi and leader of an Orthodox Jewish sect, was required by his
religious beliefs to conduct religious services twice a day with a congregation of at least
ten adult males. While the congregation attending services generally consisted of ten to
twenty family members, friends, and neighbors, the assemblage frequently numbered as
many as fifty persons, some of whom were neither friends, family members, or neighbors.
Members of the public were admitted to services and, on rare occasions, people were
solicited to attend services. The building was stocked with religious articles and benches
capable of accommodating over thirty persons. Id. at 731.
82. Id. at 732.
83. Id. at 731-32.
84. Id. at 733.
85. "The government may never regulate religious beliefs; but, the Constitution does
not prohibit absolutely government regulation of religious conduct." Id.
86. "[A] law may not have a sectarian purpose - governmental action violates the
19881
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In determining the validity of the challenged governmental
regulation, "the balance depends upon the cost to the govern-
ment of altering its activity to allow the religious practice to
continue unimpeded versus the cost to the religious interest im-
posed by the government activity. ' ' s8 In evaluating the first vari-
able of the equation, courts must recognize that "the burden on
the governmental interest depends upon the importance of the
underlying policy interests and the degree of impairment of
those interests if the regulation were changed to impose no bur-
den on religious conduct."8 9 The government must, in any event,
satisfy the "least restrictive means test" - that is, if the gov-
ernment can accomplish its goal through a means which does
not burden the free exercise of religion, it must utilize that
nonburdening technique.9 Additionally, in implementing the
"government burden formula,... [the court] must consider the
impact of a specific, religion-based exception upon government's
policy objectives.""
On the other side of the scale, a court is required to weigh
the burden imposed on religion by examining the importance of
"[t]he burdened practice within the particular religion's doc-
trines" and the amount of interference caused by the govern-
ment's regulation.9 2 In determining the importance of the reli-
gious practice, courts "often restrict themselves to determining
whether the challenged conduct is rooted in religious belief or
involves only secular, philosophical or personal choices."93 Since
Constitution if it is based upon disagreement with religious tenets or practices, or if it is
aimed at impeding religion." Id. (citing Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607).
87. "[A] law violates the free exercise clause if the 'essential effect' of the govern-
mental action is to influence negatively the pursuit of religious activity or the expression
of religious belief." Grosz, 721 F.2d at 733.
88. Id. at 734. In the opinion of the court, "[t]his principle marks the path of least
impairment of constitutional values." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. In the court's balancing analysis, if government can accomplish its policy
through a non-burdening technique, the degree of impairment is zero. In such a case,
"any sectarian interest, regardless of how lightly it weighs, wins the balancing." Id.
91. Id. See also Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; Lee, 455 U.S.
at 259.
92. Id. at 735.
93. Id. (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16; EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477,
488 (5th Cir. 1980)). The court noted that although an examination of the importance of
a religious belief "occasionally proves instructive," religious doctrine may merely be a
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only conduct flowing from religious belief warrants constitu-
tional protection, "no weight measures on the side of religion
unless the government action ultimately affects a religious prac-
tice." '94 Regulations that burden religious conduct by focusing on
the conduct itself, the Grosz court concluded, impose a heavy
burden on religion regardless of whether the contested activity
constitutes the imposition of a penalty or the denial of a benefit
as a cost of practicing one's religion."
In reconciling governmental action with a free exercise chal-
lenge, "inroads on religious liberty" may be sustained upon a
demonstration of a compelling state interest.96 Before a trial
court is required to examine the governmental interest ad-
vanced, however, the action must pass the threshold tests of
conduct focus, secular purpose, and secular effect.97 In balancing
the respective interests, "[i]f avoiding the burden on government
rises to the very upper ranges of government interest, a free ex-
ercise challenge will fail. ' ' 8 With the exception of instances in-
volving governmental interests of the highest order, the federal
courts must evaluate the interests on an ad hoc basis.99
In evaluating the Miami Beach zoning ordinance, the Grosz
court found that the threshold tests were easily satisfied. Since
the zoning law affected prayer and religious services, it obviously
involved conduct. 100 Secondly, the court determined that it
clearly had both a secular purpose and effect 10' since the city's
objective in enforcing its zoning laws was the preservation of the
residential quality of its zoning districts.'02 The objectives of
protecting inhabitants of residential neighborhoods from traffic,
noise and litter, the avoidance of spot zoning, and the preserva-
reflection of an individual's religious interpretations. Id.
94. Id. at 736.
95. Id. at 737.
96. Id. The standard was described in Yoder as "interest of the highest order." Id.
(citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215).
97. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
98. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 737.
99. Id. at 738.
100. Id.
101. The regulation was not motivated by disagreement with the religious beliefs or
aimed at impeding religion. Moreover, given the traditional function of zoning laws in
protecting the public welfare and the incidental nature of the burden imposed on reli-
gion, the effect of the regulation was deemed to be secular. Id.
102. Id.
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tion of a coherent land use scheme are well-recognized as legiti-
mate and significant governmental goals. 10 3 Evaluating the "total
inconsistency" between the city's objectives and the crowds,
noise, and disturbance generated by the religious services, the
court found that the ordinance easily satisfied the least restric-
tive means test. 0 4 Moreover, the granting of a religious based
exemption would be inappropriate since such an exception
would defeat the purpose of the regulation. 0 5 The court con-
cluded that "the important objectives underlying zoning and the
degree of infringement of those objectives caused by allowing
the religious conduct to continue place a heavy weight on the
government's side of the balancing scale."' 06
On the other side of the scale, in evaluating the burden on
religion, the court was required first to determine whether the
conduct of the religious institution constituted a religious prac-
tice. 10 7 The court considered that the solicitation of neighbors to
attend services and the participation of congregations of larger
than ten at services was not integral to the plaintiff's faith.'08
The burden imposed by the regulation, in the opinion of the
court, "stands toward the lower end of the spectrum" in compar-
ison to religious infringement scrutinized in previous free exer-
cise cases. 9 The zoning regulation did not prohibit religious
conduct per se - it merely prohibited acts in furtherance of
103. Id. The Supreme Court held in Euclid that
the segregation of residential, business, and industrial buildings will make it easier
to provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of the develop-
ment in each section ... it will increase the safety and security of home life;
greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to children, by reducing the
traffic and resulting confusion in residential sections; decrease noise and other
conditions which produce or intensify nervous disorders, preserve a more
favorable environment in which to rear children ....
272 U.S. at 394. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1973).
104. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 738.
105. Id. at 739. "A religion based exception would clearly and substantially impair
the City's policy objectives." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. While unable to define precisely the burden imposed by the zoning law, in
terms of convenience, dollars, or aesthetics, the court held that the burden did not rise to
the level of criminal liability. For cases in which the burden rose to the level of criminal
liability, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971).
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that conduct in certain areas of the city. The plaintiff was not,
however, confronted with the limited choice of ceasing his con-
duct or incurring criminal penalties,11 ° but possessed the alter-
native to conduct services in an appropriate zone.' The court
concluded its analysis by finding that the relative weights of the
burdens favored the city and that the city's interest outweighed
the free exercise interest asserted.11 2
In Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland, Inc. v. Town
of Ramapo,"3 the court's determination indicated that religious
uses are required to comply with municipal inspections, permits,
and codes which seek to protect the safety of the users of the
facility. In Congregation Beth Yitzchok, the plaintiff sought a
preliminary injunction to prohibit the municipality from enforc-
ing certain of its regulations that were claimed to interfere with
the plaintiff's operation of a religious school for the teaching of
Jewish laws and customs to children between the ages of three
and five. 1 The plaintiff asserted that the enforcement of the
town regulations had forced it to close its nursery school and
that the application of those requirements against a religious
school violated the free exercise clause.' The town code re-
quired installation of an automatic alarm and fire detection sys-
tem and site plan approval as a condition of the issuance of a
certificate of occupancy."' The premises were also subject to
compliance with the New York State Uniform Fire Prevention
and Building Code.1 7
110. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739. See supra note 109.
111. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739. The plaintiffs resided within four blocks of a zone
which permitted organized, publicly attended religious services. The court reasoned that
the plaintiffs could secure a site in an appropriate zone for holding services or could
make their home in a zone which permitted such services. Id.
112. Id. at 741.
On the free exercise side of the balance weighs the burden that Appellees bear of
conducting their services in compliance with applicable zoning restrictions or relo-
cating in a suitably zoned district. Countering on the government's side is the
substantial infringement of the City's zoning policy that would occur were the
conduct allowed to continue.
Id.
113. 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
114. Id. at 657.
115. Id. at 658.
116. Id. at 661.
117. Id.
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The court found that while the intended purpose of the con-
tested ordinance was secular, the effect was burdensome to the
plaintiff's religious observance."1 Although compliance with the
law made the practice of the plaintiff's beliefs more difficult, the
alleged burden was more attenuated than the imposition of
criminal or monetary sanctions or the loss of a significant benefit
or privilege. The court found that the purported burden was not
inherently inconsistent with the plaintiff's religious beliefs.119
In applying the balancing analysis, 20 the court concluded
that the public safety, health, and welfare were the objectives
underlying the town's interest in enforcing the challenged ordi-
nance provisions."1 The court determined that "[sluch an inter-
est is of a magnitude to justify even substantial inroads on the
free exercise of religion and clearly outweighs the indirect and
seemingly remediable burden on plaintiff's religious liberty." 2 '
The court found that the burden on the congregation was far
less substantial than in either Grosz or Lakewood Congregation
and that the town's interest was far more compelling.123 The reg-
ulations did not prohibit religious conduct per se, nor did it pro-
hibit such conduct on plaintiff's premises. The town merely in-
sisted "that plaintiff comply with certain regulations mandated
[The] plaintiff would be required to submit a set of professionally prepared con-
struction drawings demonstrating compliance with various fire-safety-related
structural features, including but not limited to a fire-resistant wall between the
garage and the synagogue; a proper fire enclosure for the building's heating equip-
ment; an approved means of egress from the synagogue and school area; and pri-
vate emergency lighting, portable fire extinguishers, smoke and fire detectors and
a fire alarm system ....
Id. at 662 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 658. "[If the . . . purpose of a law is to regulate religious beliefs, to
impede the observance of all religions or a particular religion, or to discriminate invidi-
ously between religions, that law cannot pass constitutional muster." Id. (citing Braun-
feld, 366 U.S. at 607).
119. Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F.
Supp. 655, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The plaintiff did not assert that the requirement of a
certificate of occupancy or the installation of fire safety equipment violated any tenet of
its religion. Id.
120. See supra text accompanying note 88.
121. Congregation Beth Yitzchok, 593 F. Supp. at 663.
122. Id. "[Wihile the freedom to harbor religious beliefs is absolute, the freedom to
engage in religious practices is not .... [S]uch practices are subject to regulation for the
protection of society." Id. (quoting Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christian-
ity v. Rosenfeld, 91 A.D.2d 190, 197, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920, 925 (2d Dep't 1983)).
123. Congregation Beth Yitzchok, 593 F. Supp. at 664.
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by its use of the premises as a synagogue and nursery school." 24
In denying the preliminary injunction, the court found that even
though the congregation had other avenues open to it in order to
operate the school, it chose not to pursue them. 12 5
B. New York Decisions
In contrast to the interpretation of the federal courts, the
New York courts have historically construed these principles to
establish "the primacy in principle of religions over local zoning
considerations. '' 6 Accordingly, "[rieligious structures enjoy a
constitutionally protected status which severely curtails the per-
missible extent of governmental regulation in the name of the
police powers .... Although the freedom of religious belief is
absolute, the freedom to engage in religious practices is not.'
28
As a result, "religious practices are subject to regulation for the
protection of society.' 2 9 When an irreconcilable conflict exists,
the community must accommodate the needs of a religious insti-
tution and tolerate the resultant inconvenience to the residents
of the impacted area unless the religious use "may actually de-
124. Id.
125. Id.
I continue to be troubled by plaintiff's failure to pursue other available remedies
to accomplish its objective of operating a religious nursery school.... [T]he avail-
ability of a means to keep its school in operation must weigh in the calculus of
hardships considered in the context of a preliminary injunction motion.
Id.
126. Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 315, 319
N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971). The court of appeals has recognized
"the peculiarly pre-eminent status of religious institutions under the First Amendment
provision for free exercise of religion .... " Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the
North Shore, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 288, 342
N.E.2d 534, 538, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
127. Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 496, 239 N.E.2d 891,
896, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 303 (1968). See also Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d
445, 458, 136 N.E.2d 488, 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15, 26 (1956) ("The men and women who
• . . came to Plymouth in order to worship God where they wished and in their own way
must have thought they had terminated the interference of public authorities with free
and unhandicapped exercise of religion.").
128. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
129. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Rosenfeld, 91
A.D.2d 190, 197, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920, 925 (2d Dep't 1983) (citations omitted).
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tract from the public's health, safety, welfare or morals."1 0
The New York courts have consistently taken an expansive
view of what constitutes a religious use and have held that a
religious use is more than just prayer and worship. 1 Moreover,
when expansion of religious facilities is needed to accommodate
those who wish to take advantage of the services offered by reli-
gious institutions, the same preferential analysis is applied to
the proposed expansion. 32 The activities constituting religious
or accessory uses which are entitled to preferential treatment
have also been broadly construed. It has been suggested that
"[t]he language of the courts in several cases indicates that it is
difficult to find an activity which, if sponsored by the church,
would not share the immunity."'3 3 Among the uses which have
been construed to be primary or accessory religious uses are: a
parochial school, meeting room, parking lot, and playground;' a
drug center; 3 5 a day care center; 36 and a facility for the teach-
ing of secular subjects. 3 7 Also held to constitute accessory uses
are: a gymnasium;' 38 facilities for meetings of Boy Scouts and
Girl Scouts; 3 " and an office from which the house of worship or
school is administered. 4 0
The court of appeals first enunciated the paramount status
130. Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 595, 503 N.E.2d 509, 515, 510
N.Y.S.2d 861, 867 (1986). Cf. Westchester Reform Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 494, 239 N.E.2d
at 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 302 (A religious use may be banned only if it "will have a direct
and immediate adverse effect on the health, safety or welfare of the community."); Ro-
senfeld, 91 A.D.2d at 191-92, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
131. See Bates, 1 N.Y.2d at 453, 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
132. Westchester Reform Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 493, 239 N.E.2d at 894, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 301.
133. RATHKOPF, supra note 25, at § 20.03.
134. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836-
37, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 862 (1956).
135. Slevin, 66 Misc. 2d at 318, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
136. Unitarian Universalist Church of Cent. Nassau v. Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d 978,
980, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68-69 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
137. Westbury Hebrew Congregation, Inc. v. Downer, 59 Misc. 2d 387, 388, 302
N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
138. Shaffer v. Temple Beth Emeth of Flatbush, 198 A.D. 607, 609, 190 N.Y.S. 841,
843 (2d Dep't 1921).
139. Garden City Jewish Center v. Village of Garden City, 157 N.Y.S.2d 435, 438
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956).
140. Faith for Today, Inc. v. Murdock, 11 A.D.2d 718, 719, 204 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753-54
(2d Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 761, 174 N.E.2d 743, 215 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
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of religious uses in Community Synagogue v. Bates.141 In Bates,
a congregation applied to the zoning board of appeals for a num-
ber of variances and for a special-use permit in order to convert
a single-family dwelling into a place of worship and facilities for
a Sunday School, men's club, women's social group, and youth
activities. Invalidating the denial, the court of appeals an-
nounced the New York standard for construing what constitutes
a religious use for purposes of favored treatment under zoning
ordinances:
A church is more than merely an edifice affording people the op-
portunity to worship God. Strictly religious uses and activities are
more than prayer and sacrifice and all churches recognize that the
area of their responsibility is broader than leading the congrega-
tion in prayer. Churches have always developed social groups for
adults and youth where the fellowship of the congregation is
strengthened with the result that the parent church is strength-
ened .... To limit a church to being merely a house of prayer and
sacrifice would, in a large degree, be depriving the church of the
opportunity of enlarging, perpetuating and strengthening itself
and the congregation.'42
The court noted, however, "that the religious aim of strengthen-
ing the congregation through fellowship may not be .. .per-
verted into a justification for establishing a place of entertain-
ment, such as a country club ... ."" The court also rejected
the village's contention that it had the authority to deny an ap-
plication for the location of a church at any particular site, not-
ing that "if the municipality ha[d] the unfettered power to say
that the 'precise spot' selected is not the right one, the munici-
pality [would have] the power to say eventually which is the
proper 'precise spot.' "14 In effect, the court "forbade localities
to bar religious uses on the ground that they had not met a bur-
141. 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956).
142. Id. at 453, 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22.
When a member of the congregation cements friendships with other members of
the congregation, the church benefits and becomes stronger. It is a religious activ-
ity for the church to provide a place for these social groups to meet, since the
church by so doing is developing into a stronger and closer knit religious unit.
Id. at 453, 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 458, 136 N.E.2d at 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
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den of proof that other suitable locations could not be found.""'
In a companion case, Diocese of Rochester v. Planning
Board,'"' the court of appeals determined that "a zoning ordi-
nance may not wholly exclude a church or synagogue from any
residential district . . . [since such a restriction] bears no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, peace, or
general welfare of the community."' 47 Churches (and schools),
the court noted, occupy a different status from commercial en-
terprises and, as a result, different considerations must apply. 4 "
Accordingly, the court found that any purported adverse effect
on property values resulting from the operation of a religious (or
educational) use is an unauthorized consideration and that
"mere pecuniary loss to a few persons should not bar" the estab-
lishment of such uses. 49 Also considered by the court to be irrel-
evant was any potential loss in tax revenues, as well as noise,
traffic hazards, or other inconveniences which might result from
the establishment of such religious or educational uses. 50 The
court, therefore, found that the planning board's denial of the
Diocese's application to erect a church, school, meeting room,
and parking area based upon the foregoing irrelevant considera-
tions, bore no substantial relation to the promotion of public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 5' As a harbinger of
the court's Bagnardi decision thirty years in the future, how-
ever, the court opined that municipalities may not be wholly
powerless with respect to such uses: "That is not to say that ap-
145. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, 38 N.Y.2d at 287, 342 N.E.2d at 537, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 752.
146. 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
147. Id. at 522, 136 N.E.2d at 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 858 (citing North Shore Unita-
rian Soc'y v. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 525, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1951)). Diocese of Rochester is the seminal pronouncement of the "ex-
empt" status of educational institutions.
148. Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d at 523, 136 N.E.2d at 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
149. Id. at 524, 136 N.E.2d at 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
150. Id. at 524-25, 136 N.E.2d at 836, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62. Cf. Bagnardi, 68
N.Y.2d at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
[E]ducational and religious uses which would unarguably be contrary to the pub-
lic's health, safety or welfare need not be permitted at all. . . . Such uses are
clearly not what the court had in mind when it stated that traffic and similar
problems are outweighed by the benefits a church or school brings ....
68 N.Y.2d at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (citations omitted).
151. Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d at 526, 136 N.E.2d at 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
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propriate restrictions may never be imposed with respect to a
church and school and accessory uses, nor is it to say that under
no circumstances may they ever be excluded from designated
areas."
52
In Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 53 the court of ap-
peals determined that "when the educational and religious needs
of the community have grown, so that existing structures are in-
adequate, the same reasoning which [it] applied to the initial
construction or use of the facilities must pertain to a proposed
expansion . . . of the facilities.'' 5  The court also held that a
municipality may sustain the denial of the establishment or ex-
pansion of a religious use only if it is convincingly shown that
the use "will have a direct and immediate adverse effect upon
the health, safety or welfare of the community.' ' 55 The court
opined that while factors which may justify the exclusion of
commercial uses from residential areas are an inadequate justifi-
cation when religious uses are involved, those factors may be
considered for the purpose of mitigating against or minimizing
traffic hazards and the effect of the religious use on the sur-
rounding area. 51 Conditions imposed to mitigate against unde-
sirable effects of a religious use, however, may be considered to
be invalid if they require more than a modest increase in ex-
152. Id.
153. 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968).
154. Id. at 493, 239 N.E.2d at 894, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
155. Id. at 494, 239 N.E.2d at 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 302. Cf. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at
595, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867 ("[Elducational and religious uses which
would unarguably be contrary to the public's health, safety or welfare need not be per-
mitted at all."). See infra notes 371-377 and accompanying text.
156. Westchester Reform Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 303-04.
We have not said that considerations of the surrounding area and potential traffic
hazards are unrelated to public health, safety, or welfare when religious structures
are involved. We have simply said that they are outweighed by the constitutional
prohibition against the abridgement of the free exercise of religion by the public
benefit and welfare which is itself an attribute of religious worship in a
community.
Id. at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304. See also Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 596,
503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (reasonable conditions relating to the health,
safety and welfare may be imposed on religious and educational institutions to the same
extent that they may be imposed on commercial enterprises). See infra notes 378-381
and accompanying text.
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penditures by the religious institution.1 57 The Westchester Re-
form Temple court, however, held that where an irreconcilable
conflict exists between the right to erect a religious structure
and the potential hazards of traffic or diminution in property
value, the rights of religion must prevail.1 58
In Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the North Shore,
Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor,15 9 the court held
unconstitutional an ordinance which required a special permit as
a condition of conducting a religious use and required denial of
that special permit application if the religious use would have
any detrimental effect on public health, safety, or general wel-
fare, or if the setback requirements could not be satisfied. 60 The
ordinance required a 100-foot setback for religious uses in all in-
stances, and the requirement could not be varied.61 The court of
appeals posed the issue as whether the ordinance's provisions
contained guidelines which permitted a compromise between the
detrimental impacts on the area and the constitutional protec-
tions afforded religious institutions. 62
Since the ordinance subjected religious uses to an invariable
setback requirement, it offended the requirement that efforts be
made to accommodate religious uses, particularly since situa-
tions might exist in which no detriment to public safety or wel-
fare would result from a setback of less than that required. 63
Additionally, the court found that there was insufficient evi-
dence to justify application of such a requirement to the prop-
erty.1 64 While the record contained some indication of the exis-
tence of traffic or noise-related inconveniences, the court found
that the record lacked "hard evidence" to that effect and that no
effort was made to mitigate the inconveniences, "short of out-
157. Westchester Reform Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 897, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 304. Cf. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 516, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
See infra note 381 and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304. See also Bagnardi, 68
N.Y.2d at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 516, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
159. 38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d 534, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
950 (1976).
160. Id. at 289, 342 N.E.2d at 539, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 753-54.
161. Id. at 289, 342 N.E.2d at 539, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
162. Id. at 288, 342 N.E.2d at 538, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
163. Id. at 289, 342 N.E.2d at 539, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
164. Id.
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right denial of the variance."' 5 The court also rejected the vil-
lage's argument that since most of the congregation's members
resided outside of the village, the synagogue should be required
to demonstrate that there was no more suitable location for the
synagogue. 166
While the decisions of the court of appeals have enunciated
the broad limits of municipal authority to regulate religious
uses, it has been left to the appellate division and lower courts
to resolve disputes regarding the application of specific zoning
restrictions to various religious uses and factual situations. For
example, in American Friends of the Society of St. Pius, Inc. v.
Schwab, 6 7 the second department announced the critical stan-
dard of review to be utilized in examining allegations of threats
to the welfare of the community posed by a religious use. 68 The
court rebuffed efforts of a village to deny an application for per-
mission to use property as a church and residence for priests.
Rejecting claims that the denial was appropriate due to allega-
tions of increases in traffic, danger to area residents, lot coverage
in excess of that allowed by the zoning ordinance, drainage and
sewerage problems, and destruction of the character of the
area,""9 the court determined that
[hiuman experience teaches us that public officials, when faced
with pressure to bar church uses by those residing in a residential
neighborhood, tend to avoid any appearance of an antireligious
stance and temper their decision by carefully couching their
grounds for refusal to permit such use in terms of traffic dangers,
fire hazards and noise and disturbance, rather than on such
crasser grounds as lessening of property values or loss of open
space or entry of strangers into the neighborhood or undue
crowding of the area. Under such circumstances it is necessary to
most carefully scrutinize the reasons advanced for a denial to in-
sure that they are real and not merely pretexts used to preclude
165. Id. at 289-90, 342 N.E.2d at 539, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
166. Id. at 290, 342 N.E.2d at 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56.
167. 68 A.D.2d 646, 417 N.Y.S.2d 991 (2d Dep't 1979).
168. The decision has been described as "perhaps the most far-reaching New York
assessment of the free exercise considerations implicated when zoning unfavorably af-
fects religious organizations .... " Walker, What Constitutes a Religious Use for Zoning
Purposes, 27 CATH. LAW, 129, 180 (1982).
169. American Friends of the Soc'y of St. Pius v. Schwab, 68 A.D.2d 646, 650, 417
N.Y.S.2d 991, 993 (2d Dep't 1979).
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the exercise of constitutionally protected privileges. 7 '
As a result, the appellate division annulled the denial of the ap-
plication and remitted the matter with directions to grant the
application so that the establishment of the church would be fa-
cilitated while any detrimental effects would be mitigated. 7 '
The second department sustained the denial of a special
permit application made by Reverend Sun Myung Moon for the
operation of a training and recruitment center in Holy Spirit
Association for the Unification of World Christianity v. Rosen-
feld.172 While the activities of the "Moonies" may have provoked
a hostile reaction from the public, the record was devoid of evi-
dence sufficient to demonstrate that their activities constituted a
threat to the public health or welfare.' 3 The law is clear that
public intolerance, animosity, or unrest does not justify a prohi-
bition of free assembly and association. 74 However, the church's
misrepresentations to the zoning board of appeals, as well as vio-
lations of the zoning law while the application was pending, jus-
tified the denial of the special permit. 75 Thus the court held
that "[n]othing we have said is intended even remotely to imply
that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity,
commit frauds upon the public."' 76
The rights of religious organizations were expanded in Is-
lamic Society of Westchester and Rockland, Inc. v. Foley,177 in
which the court invalidated the denial of an area variance re-
quired for the conversion of a single-family house into a Muslim
house of worship and religious school. 17 The ordinance permit-
ted religious institutions in the single-family district in which
the property was located, but required that no building be
170. Id. at 649, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
171. Id. at 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
172. 91 A.D.2d 190, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2d Dep't 1983). See also Anderson & Mayo,
Land Use Control, 1984 Survey of N.Y. Law, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 485, 493-94 (1985).
173. Rosenfeld, 91 A.D.2d at 199, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
174. Id. at 199, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
175. Id. at 200, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
176. Id. (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306). "[If the church would not, or could
not, comply with representations made while the application for a special use permit was
pending, the zoning board could properly infer that it would not comply with conditions
imposed on its proposed use." Rosenfeld, 91 A.D.2d at 201, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
177. 96 A.D.2d 536, 464 N.Y.S.2d 844 (2d Dep't 1983).
178. Id.
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nearer than 100 feet from any lot line or street. Portions of the
existing dwelling were as close as 37.75 feet to the rear lot line of
the property. 179 The zoning board of appeals denied the vari-
ance, finding that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate prac-
tical difficulties; that the variance was substantial; that the in-
tended use of the property would generate excessive traffic on
local roads and substantially impair the privacy, enjoyment, and
use of the neighboring residential properties; and that petitioner
could construct a new structure elsewhere on the property in
conformance with the zoning regulations.18 °
The second department noted that municipalities must ap-
ply the requirements of their zoning ordinances in a more flexi-
ble manner when religious institutions are involved.18 In re-
jecting the denial of the variance, the court held that there is
"an affirmative duty on the part of a local zoning board to sug-
gest measures to accommodate the planned religious use, with-
out causing the religious institution to incur excessive additional
costs, while mitigating the detrimental effects on the health,
safety and welfare of the surrounding community."' 82 The great-
est objection to the proposed variance involved plans to convert
a garage near the property line into a congregational center.
This conversion would necessarily center the most intensive use
of the lot nearest to the highest concentration of residential
dwellings. 8 ' Since the court concluded that there must be alter-
natives, so that the most intense use might be located farther
from the lot lines, the application was remitted to the zoning
board of appeals with directions to grant the variance, subject to
such reasonable conditions as would permit the establishment of
the religious use while mitigating the detrimental effects on the
community. 84
The second department continued to recognize the elevated
position of educational and religious organizations in North
Shore Hebrew Academy v. Wegman.18 5 Therein, the Village of
179. Id. at 537, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 537, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 845-46.
184. Id. at 537, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
185. 105 A.D.2d 702, 481 N.Y.S.2d 142 (2d Dep't 1984). See also Rice, Zoning and
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Kings Point's zoning ordinance permitted public and private
schools and houses of worship in residential districts upon the
granting of a special permit from the board of trustees.18 6 In ad-
dition to operating a Hebrew day school, the North Shore He-
brew Academy began to conduct classes in folk dancing and mu-
sic on Sundays in violation of a previously issued special
permit." 7 A subsequent application to amend the special permit
to sanction such activities was denied, since "the board of trust-
ees concluded that . . . [the] 'attendant noise and traffic is an
unwarranted interference with the peaceful use and enjoyment
of the properties in the neighborhood' and that the on-site park-
ing facilities . . . were grossly inadequate for the [academy's]
program."1 '
The court concluded that the program was sufficiently re-
lated to the academy's overall educational and religious purposes
to entitle it to the protections accorded religious and educational
uses and that the board of trustees had unconstitutionally ap-
plied the village's zoning law in order to prohibit the expansion
of those programs."8 The village could not
prohibit the academy from conducting the Sunday... program[s]
for the same reasons which would justify the exclusion or restric-
tion of commercial activities, including the disruption of the tran-
quility customarily enjoyed by neighboring property owners on
Sunday mornings by the noise and automobile traffic generated or
expected to be generated by the academy's center for the per-
forming arts.19°
In addition, the court determined that the board of trustees'
"blanket prohibition of the Sunday classes in performing arts
constitute[d] an impermissible interference in the academy's
constitutionally protected educational and religious functions,
which [was] not directly related to the zoning use of the real
property ..... 191
Land Use, 1985 Survey of N.Y. Law, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 747, 757-59 (1986).
186. North Shore Hebrew Academy v. Wegman, 105 A.D.2d 702, 703, 481 N.Y.S.2d
142, 144 (2d Dep't 1984).
187. Id. at 704, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 705, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
190. Id. at 705, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (citations omitted).
191. Id. (citations omitted). See infra notes 314-323 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, had the reasons advanced by the board of
trustees been sufficient to survive the "stricter scrutiny" applied
to zoning restrictions on religious institutions, the determination
could not have been upheld since it was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.192 The record was devoid of "hard evidence"
that the noise and traffic resulting from the academy's activities
"prior to the denial of the amended permit materially disrupted
the tranquility of the surrounding neighborhood or that the on-
site parking facilities were inadequate . ". . .' ' The opponents
were, in the opinion of the court, motivated by "their specula-
tion and fears,"19 a clearly insufficient basis for prohibiting the
operation of a religious institution. In the absence of evidence
that the operation would have a direct and immediate adverse
effect upon the health, safety, or welfare of the community, the
board of trustees lacked authority to deny the application.'
The second department further held the ordinance's re-
quirement that religious institutions located in residential areas
provide a minimum number of on-site parking spaces to be un-
constitutional on its face "to the extent that the board of trust-
ees lack[ed] the power to vary this requirement." ' While the
possible inadequacy of on-site parking was a justifiable concern
to the neighboring property owners, "a municipality has an af-
firmative obligation to adopt less restrictive alternatives [than]
completely barring such an institution from locating or ex-
panding its facilities in a residential neighborhood. 1 97 Accord-
ingly, the court remitted the matter with directions to grant the
requested amendment to the special permit after "establishing
reasonable conditions to mitigate the adverse effects of the
[academy's] program on the surrounding neighborhood ....
The lower courts have examined a variety of situations and
uses which were claimed to be incorporated within the definition
192. North Shore Hebrew Academy, 105 A.D.2d at 705, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
193. Id. at 705-06, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 706, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
195. Id. Cf. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 589, 595, 503 N.E.2d at 511, 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d
at 863, 867.
196. North Shore Hebrew Academy, 105 A.D.2d at 706, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46 (ci-
tations omitted).
197. Id. at 706, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (citations omitted).
198. Id. at 707, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (citations omitted).
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of "religious uses." Among the most comprehensive and expan-
sive of such lower court decisions is Slevin v. Long Island Jew-
ish Medical Center,19 in which it was determined that a drug
center for young people was a religious use of religious prop-
erty. 00 In Slevin, neighbors objected to a church's proposal to
operate a drug center program in its rectory in a residentially
zoned area in which churches or other buildings used exclusively
for religious uses were authorized. The purpose of the program
was to reach nonaddicted youngsters in the early stages of ex-
perimentation with "soft" drugs.20'
The court found that the drug center program was a "reli-
gious use of church property and a valid zoning extension of the
religious institution ' '110 since the church sought "to discharge a
spiritual duty felt by clergymen and their congregants. "203 The
court rejected allegations that religious uses must be conducted
by the church itself only for the benefit of its members.20 4 In
rejecting that argument, the court reasoned that
[i]f a use of church property is a religious use, why should it mat-
ter that those of other religions or beliefs will benefit, or that the
church engages or contracts or permits specialists or professional
people on its premises to execute the religious use? The thought
of limiting benefit struggles against the strong modern current of
pan-ecumenicalism, and frustrates the desirable mutual in-
terchange of use of religious institutions in our society today,
ranging from bingo, to scout meetings, to lectures, to community
action programs, to interfaith programs. The fact that the hospi-
tal supplies funds accords with the fact that religious funds are
typically contributed. 2 05
199. 66 Misc. 2d 312, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).
200. Id. at 318, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
201. Id. at 313, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 941. No residential facilities were to be provided,
nor were drugs of any nature to be provided. The project was to be jointly financed,
staffed, and supervised by a local hospital. The participants had daily contact with the
church's minister. The court recognized that the definition of what constitutes a "reli-
gious use" is often a complex task, but accepted that "the term 'religious use' is defined,
for zoning purposes, as 'broadly extended to conduct with a religious purpose.'" Id. at
316, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
202. Id. at 318, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
203. Id. at 317, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
204. Id. at 318, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
205. Id. at 318-19, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
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The court also determined that "if there is a genuine danger
to the community, if an unreasonably unhealthful element is in
fact introduced, the factor of religiosity alone cannot grant a le-
gal immunity,"20 6 and the use may be denied if the court is
"convinced that proposed uses will increase community hazards
to the point of real personal danger."20 7 In the court's opinion,
"[w]here the religious use may be so fraught with danger or peril
to the community because of the particular use sought, the det-
riment to the community can outweigh the religious considera-
tion."20 8 Since a factual determination of the impact was re-
quired, the court remanded the dispute for a determination of
the issue of public danger.20 9
Significantly, in Sephardic Community of New Rochellel
Scarsdale, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals,21 0 it was succinctly
determined that religious institutions are not required to
demonstrate practical difficulties in order to be entitled to an
area variance."'
Whether a particular land use constitutes a "church" has
consistently troubled the courts. In Bright Horizon House, Inc.
v. Zoning Board of Appeals,"' it was held that a Christian Sci-
ence care facility did not constitute a religious use. 3 The court
affirmed the finding that the facility did not qualify as a permit-
ted use, either as a church, a public hospital, or a conventional
health care facility." 4 Petitioners proposed to operate a facility
to be staffed by accredited Christian Science nurses, and practi-
tioners would not provide standard medical nursing or physi-
cian's care to the thirty-two fee-paying residents. " 5 Patients of
the facility would depend, instead, on Christian Science teach-
ing, which eschews traditional medical care and relies on the
power of faith to cure illness.'
206. Id. at 319, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
207. Id. at 320, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 321, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
210. N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 1986, at 15, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1986).
211. Id.
212. 121 Misc. 2d 703, 469 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1983).
213. Id. at 711, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
214. Id. at 707-08, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 854-55.
215. Id. at 704-05, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53.
216. Id. at 705, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
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Since "[t]he zoning ordinance [did] not define the term
'church', 217 the court was required "to define the term in light
of its ordinary and accepted meaning."2 18 The court determined
that the facts supported the conclusion of the zoning board of
appeals that the facility did not constitute a church since its
purpose was not public worship" 9 and it lacked a common area
or sanctuary for worship.220 The court opined that the proposed
facility "does not take on a religious use simply because its resi-
dents pray and contemplate as part of the process of healing,"
since "[i]t is the proposed use of the land, not the religious na-
ture of the organization, which must control." '221 "The constitu-
tional protection afforded all religions and religious beliefs is not
hindered by the law's refusal to mandate zoning approval of
every institution solely because it is sponsored ... by a religious
organization in accordance with its beliefs." '222
The court also rejected a challenge that the ordinance was
unconstitutional as applied. The court noted that although "reli-
gious institutions are virtually immune from zoning restric-
tions, ' 2 3 that policy has emerged from instances in which the
contested use was a church or synagogue or uses "accessory to
the principal use of the structure as a place of worship. '22 In
the court's opinion, however, "a disproportionate accessory use
would still be barred"2 25 and "uses ordinarily prohibited in a res-
idential neighborhood ...could not invoke the First Amend-
ment simply because the use is associated with deeply held reli-
gious beliefs. '226 "[A] narrower construction has been applied" 227
if a use is neither ancillary nor accessory. It was also held that
the proposed use was not a "religious use" and, accordingly, the
constitutional attack on the application of the ordinance was
217. Id. at 706, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 707, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
220. Id. at 708, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
221. Id. at 708-09, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
222. Id. at 709, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
223. Id. at 710, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
224. Id.
225. Id. (citing Gallagher v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 669
(1963)).
226. Bright Horizon House, Inc., 121 Misc. 2d at 710, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
227. Id. at 710-11, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
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rejected.2 28
In People v. Kalayjian,2 19 a conviction for the use of a one-
family residence other than as a single-family dwelling was af-
firmed in spite of defendant's claims that the premises consti-
tuted a parish house for religious purposes.2 30 The zoning ordi-
nance allowed religious uses as a permitted use and defined such
a religious use as "[c]hurches and other places of worship, in-
cluding parish houses and buildings for religious instructions. '"2Is
The house contained sixteen bedrooms and was occupied by
twenty-five people comprising four separate families.3 2 The oc-
cupants were members of the American Orthodox Catholic
Church; one of the occupants was a monk and three were church
deacons, although they were employed on a full-time basis else-
where. Although all received religious instruction, no religious
services were conducted on the premises. "The mere designation
by a church of [a] private residence as a parish house is not con-
trolling" upon the municipality or the courts for zoning pur-
poses.2 33 A parish house is, in the opinion of the court, "an auxil-
iary building belonging to a church and used for its business,
social or extension activities. 2 34 Since the premises were neither
owned nor used by a church, the court concluded that the prem-
ises could not be considered a parish house and was an illegal
zoning use.235
While the federal courts have interpreted the first amend-
ment as providing scant protection to religious organizations
faced with zoning impediments, the New York courts have inter-
preted the same constitutional provision, as well as the limita-
tion on the delegation of zoning authority, as severely limiting
228. Id. at 711-12, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
229. 76 Misc. 2d 1097, 352 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1973).
230. Id. at 1099, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 117. See also Independent Church of the Realiza-
tion of God v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 81 A.D.2d 585, 437 N.Y.S.2d 443 (2d Dep't
1981).
231. People v. Kalayjian, 76 Misc. 2d at 1097, 1099, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 117 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 2d Dep't 1973).
232. Id. at 1098, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
233. Id. at 1099, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (citing Slevin, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 319 N.Y.S.2d
937).
234. Id. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1971).
235. Kalayjian, 76 Misc. 2d at 1098-99, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 117. While not deciding the
issue, the court questioned whether a parish house could constitute a main, rather than
an accessory, use. Id.
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the ability of zoning authorities to deal with the adverse effects
of religious use of property. As can be discerned from the forego-
ing decisions, the New York courts have historically been ex-
ceedingly generous in categorizing uses as "religious" and have
traditionally been very reluctant to sanction municipal impedi-
ments to the religious use of property. They have viewed with
suspicion reasons profferred for the denial of religious permits
and have required zoning authorities to accommodate various
religious uses. Nevertheless, the Bagnardi decision has provided
zoning authorities with the ability to balance the important and
sometimes competing interests of religious institutions and the
preservation of the community's residential neighborhoods.
III. Education Cases
Just as religious uses enjoy a qualified "exemption" from
zoning regulations as the result of their unique contribution to
the welfare and morals of the community, educational uses, by
their very nature, equally contribute to the general welfare of
the community. 3 6 The courts have consistently held that
"[elducational uses have a proper place in residential dis-
tricts."23 Consequently, the historical "exemption" from zoning
restrictions has, until recently, rendered almost all educational
uses beyond the practical jurisdiction of municipal planning and
zoning authorities. However, just as the decision of the court of
appeals in Bagnardi238 has increased the ability of a municipal-
ity to examine the negative impacts of religious uses on neigh-
236. See Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526, 136 N.E.2d 827,
836, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 862 (1956); New York Inst. of Technology v. Le Boutillier, 33
N.Y.2d 125, 130, 305 N.E.2d 754, 757, 350 N.Y.S.2d 623, 628 (1973); Concordia Collegiate
Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 195-96, 93 N.E.2d 632, 635-36 (1950). "Educational uses
...are akin to churches in that they have a proper and traditional place in the residen-
tial districts of the community, and have such a strong tendency to promote the general
welfare that they cannot be excluded by means of zoning restrictions ...." RATHKOPF,
supra note 25, at § 20.02[1l]. "Of all the major community facilities, schools, in general
...have the strongest claim to access to all types of residential districts . . . for here
the facility is a public one, and the service criterion is at its strongest." N. WILLIAMS,
supra note 2, at § 76.01.
237. New York Inst. of Technology v. Ruckgaber, 65 Misc. 2d 241, 244, 317 N.Y.S.2d
89, 92 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
238. Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 503 N.E.2d 509, 510 N.Y.S.2d 861
(1986). See infra notes 365-383 and accompanying text.
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boring areas and on the community, to deny such uses under
certain circumstances, and to require mitigation of adverse im-
pacts, Bagnardi has similarly altered the paramount status en-
joyed by most educational institutions. No longer are all educa-
tional uses automatically entitled to the traditional universal
presumptive preeminence routinely enjoyed once over virtually
all zoning regulations. Bagnardi demonstrates a desire to strike
a balance between the significant contribution made to our soci-
ety by churches and schools and the frequent inimical conse-
quences of their presence in residential neighborhoods. Never-
theless, legitimate educational uses continue to be accorded a
highly significant degree of immunity from zoning regulations.
In reviewing restrictions imposed on educational uses, the
New York courts have applied the same standards and have ex-
pressed the same deference to such uses as in religious cases.2"9
Indeed, the critical language of the seminal decisions of Diocese
of Rochester and Bagnardi specifically apply to both religious
and educational uses. Many of the other signficant decisions re-
viewing the status of religious or educational uses employ virtu-
ally identical reasoning in determining whether each form of
socially significant use is subject to particular zoning re-
strictions.24 Any minor differences which might be perceived in
the treatment of the two uses relate to the "peculiarly pre-emi-
nent status of religious institutions under the First Amendment
provision for free exercise of religion ... 241
A. Public Schools
The primary conflict between zoning provisions and educa-
tional uses relates to the status and rights of private and paro-
239. "There is little difference in the attitude of the courts toward churches and
that displayed toward schools." RATHKOPF, supra note 25, at § 20.02[1]. "While such
[educational] uses usually do not evoke the vigorous judicial response which is typical in
litigation involving religious use, the courts regard educational uses as worthy of special
consideration." 1 R.M. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.07 (3d ed.
1984).
240. See Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293
N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968); Le Boutillier, 33 N.Y.2d 125, 305 N.E.2d 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 623.
241. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor,
38 N.Y.2d at 283, 288, 342 N.E.2d 534, 538, 379 N.Y.S.2d 746, 753 (1975). See also
RATHKOPF, supra note 25, at § 20.02[1] n.1.
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chial institutions since public schools, including B.O.C.E.S. facil-
ities, 242  are immune from local zoning controls.24  Such a
preclusion of local authority is mandated since local exercise of
the police power and zoning authority is limited by the state
constitution and applicable statutes244 and the State has not re-
linquished to localities its authority regarding the location and
construction of school buildings.24 5
The Constitution of the State imposes the duty upon the Legisla-
ture to provide a system of free public education, and reserves to
the Legislature full power in relation to the "maintenance, sup-
port or administration" of the system, notwithstanding the pow-
ers conferred by the Home Rule provisions of the Constitution
(citations omitted). In compliance with the direction of the Con-
stitution, the Education Law has been enacted, and it imposes
upon school districts or the boards of education therein the duty
to locate schools and empowers them to secure sites by condem-
nation, if necessary.2"6
As has also been noted:
242. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 1950, 1951 (McKinney Supp. 1987). B.O.C.E.S. fur-
nishes certain educational services to its members including vocational education, educa-
tion for the handicapped, summer schools, and various other shared services. It is "[a]
policy-making board of citizens with a district superintendent of schools as executive
officer." F. DE LA FLEUR, SHARED SERVICES BOARD 9 (1961). B.O.C.E.S. also refers,
loosely, to "the geographical area covered by the activities of such a board, including
common, union free and central school districts as well as some village superintendencies
and smaller city districts which may participate directly in the services offered by such
board." Id.
243. Jewish Bd. of Family and Children's Services v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 79
A.D.2d 657, 658, 433 N.Y.S.2d 840, 841 (2d Dep't 1980). See also Board of Coop. Educ.
Services v. Gaynor, 60 Misc. 2d 316, 320, 303 N.Y.S.2d 183, 189 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1969), aff'd, 33 A.D.2d 701, 306 N.Y.S.2d 216 (2d Dep't 1969), motion for leave to appeal
denied, 26 N.Y.2d 612 (1970); Board of Educ. v. City of Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d 98, 302
N.Y.S.2d 71 (4th Dep't 1969); Durand v. Board of Coop. Educ. Services, 70 Misc. 2d 429,
432, 334 N.Y.S.2d 670, 675 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972), aff'd, 41 A.D.2d 803, 341
N.Y.S.2d 884 (2d Dep't 1973).
244. Board of Educ. v. City of Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d at 100, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
245. Town of Onondaga v. Central School Dist., 56 Misc. 2d 26, 27, 287 N.Y.S.2d
581, 584 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1968). "The power of the city to regulate the erec-
tion of all buildings ... cannot overcome or survive the broad and exclusive grant to the
State of authority to regulate all school matters spelled out in the Constitution and, in
turn, delegated by the Legislature to boards of education." Board of Educ. v. City of
Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d at 101, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
246. Union Free School Dist. v. Village of Hewlett Bay Park, 279 A.D. 618, 618-19,
107 N.Y.S.2d 858, 860 (2d Dep't 1951) (citations omitted).
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Since the State has reserved unto itself the control over and the
authority to regulate all school matters and, further, since the
State has surrendered to school districts a portion of its (the
State's) sovereign power and delegated to the districts some of
these responsibilities imposed by the Constitution, including the
selection of building sites and erection of buildings thereon ... it
follows that a school district should be and is immune from the
attempted regulation of these rights and responsibilities by means
of building codes or zoning ordinances.2 41 7
As a result, a municipality may not exclude public schools from
its borders 4" and may not subject educational uses to the provi-
sions of its building codes.24 9 This preferred status is accorded to
public schools regardless of whether the school district is the
owner and occupant or merely the tenant of the property.25 °
The conflict between the legitimate goals of zoning laws and
the exempt status of public schools is, perhaps, best illustrated
by the instances in which surplus school buildings retained by a
local school district are sought to be utilized for profit-making
uses. Due to shrinking enrollments, school districts have become
reluctant landlords who must maintain a vast number of empty
school buildings.2 51 In order to defray the costs necessary to
maintain such buildings for future utilization,252 it is not uncom-
mon for a school district to lease surplus buildings located in
247. Board of Educ. v. City of Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d at 100, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 74. See
also County of Westchester v. Village of Mamaroneck, 41 Misc. 2d 811, 246 N.Y.S.2d 770
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1964), aff'd, 22 A.D.2d 143, 255 N.Y.S.2d 290 (2d Dep't
1964), af'd, 16 N.Y.2d 940, 212 N.E.2d 442, 264 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1965); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§
401, 407, 408 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1987). "In the very nature of things, local govern-
ment units, including school districts, in the performance of their purely governmental
duties and activities, should not be subjected to building code regulations or such other
regulatory restrictions as zoning ordinances." Board of Educ. v. City of Buffalo, 32
A.D.2d at 101, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
248. Gaynor, 33 A.D.2d at 701, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 218; Union Free School Dist. v.
Village of Hewlett Bay Park, 198 Misc. 932, 934, 102 N.Y.S.2d 81, 83 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1950), aff'd, 279 A.D. 618, 107 N.Y.S.2d 858 (2d Dep't 1951).
249. Board of Educ. v. City of Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d at 100, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
250. Jewish Bd. of Family and Children's Services, 79 A.D.2d at 658, 433 N.Y.S.2d
at 841; Gaynor, 60 Misc. 2d at 320-21, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
251. See Village of Camillus v. West Side Gymnastics School, 109 Misc. 2d 609, 612,
440 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1981).
252. "The closing of schools statewide presents a severe financial problem for the
districts since the buildings must be maintained and fixed costs, such as bond payments,
insurance, heat and light, continue." Id. at 609, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
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residential zones to enterprises for uses which are not permitted
in a residential district. When confronted by zoning restrictions
barring such proposed uses, school districts have, in a number of
instances, asserted the exemption from local zoning laws to
which they are entitled while carrying out state functions.
In Village of Camillus v. West Side Gymnastics School,25 3
for example, in order to defray fixed costs, the school district
leased an elementary school building located in a residential dis-
trict to two entities for use as office and training space and for a
gymnastics school.2 54 The court determined that while a school
district's proprietary activities are subject to local zoning, the
maintenance of empty school buildings is an exempt governmen-
tal function.255 Accordingly, the court determined that in adopt-
ing section 403-a(1) of the Education Law,2 56 which authorizes
the leasing of excess school property, the legislature exercised its
constitutional authority to regulate education, thereby preclud-
ing the application of local zoning laws. 57 As a result, in the
opinion of the court, a school district is free to lease empty
school buildings in residentially zoned areas to any user, regard-
less of the effect thereof on the residents of the area, and a mu-
nicipality is precluded from applying its zoning regulations to
such noneducational use.2 58
The appellate division, fourth department, however, has
reached a contrary conclusion while affirming the granting of a
use variance to a school district in order to permit an unused
school building, located in a residential zone, to be leased for
limited industrial use. The court in Foster v. Saylor, e59 specifi-
cally determined that the lease of the property was subject to
253. 109 Misc. 2d 609, 440 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1981).
254. Id. at 609-10, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 822-23.
255. Id. at 612-14, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25. "Necessity creates the duty and it is the
duty of the board to lease, if the board determines it is in the best interests of the Dis-
trict." Id. at 613, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
256. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 403-a(1) (McKinney 1972).
257. West Side Gymnastics School, 109 Misc. 2d at 614, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 825. The
power to regulate school matters has been reserved to the State by article IX, section 1
of the State Constitution which authority, in turn, has been delegated to the Commis-
sioner of Education and to the local boards of education with respect to the use of excess
school buildings pursuant to section 403-a of the Education Law. Id.
258. Id.
259. 85 A.D.2d 876, 447 N.Y.S.2d 75 (4th Dep't 1981).
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local zoning regulations.2 6 The cases relied upon by the court26'
indicated that, contrary to the West Side Gymnastics School
decision, the court considered the school district's lease of the
property to constitute a proprietary function.2 " As is discussed
more fully below, 26 3 it is more appropriate, at least from a plan-
ning perspective, to examine the use for which the property is to
be devoted, rather than blindly to grant immunity solely upon
the status of the owner. While the issue of pre-emption is essen-
tially unresolved, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to
authorize local school authorities to lease space in an unused
school building to any commercial enterprise, no matter how ob-
noxious or inconsistent with the character of the area the use
may be. The West Side Gymnastics School opinion noted that
the exemption which it found to exist did not render a munici-
pality completely powerless against such repugnant uses. 64 The
court also noted that a municipality may pursue a nuisance ac-
tion.2 5 However, it is clearly illogical to remove a municipality's
zoning jurisdiction in dealing with such commercial uses and rel-
260. Id. at 877, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
261. Little Joseph Realty, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 41 N.Y.2d 738, 363 N.E.2d 1163,
395 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1977) (asphalt manufacturing plant on property leased from munici-
pality and operated by and for commercial benefit of private operator constitutes propri-
etary function of local government and is subject to local zoning regulations); Nehrbas v.
Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957) (munici-
pality may use building located in residential zone for municipal purposes which uses
would otherwise be prohibited by zoning law if use of property is in furtherance of per-
formance of governmental function); Board of Educ. v. City of Buffalo, 32 A.D.2d 98, 302
N.Y.S.2d 71 (4th Dep't 1969) (local governmental units, including school districts, in the
performance of purely governmental duties and activities not subject to local building
codes and zoning ordinances).
262. No issue as to exemption from zoning regulations exists in the instance when a
school district is the vendor of a surplus school building located in a residential zone and
the proposed use of the building is not a permissible use in a residential zone. The ven-
dee is required to obtain a use variance and such variance may properly be denied, re-
gardless of the financial proof of hardship, if the variant use would destroy the essential
character of the locality. Rostlee Associates, Ltd. v. Amelkin, 121 A.D.2d 725, 726, 503
N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (2d Dep't 1986) (medical office center). Cf., Commco, Inc. v. Amelkin,
109 A.D.2d 794, 486 N.Y.S.2d 305 (2d Dep't 1985), motion for leave to appeal denied, 65
N.Y.2d 606, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1985) (senior citizen residence).
263. See infra Part V, Conclusion.
264. West Side Gymnastics School, 109 Misc. 2d at 613, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
265. "The law of nuisance and that of zoning both relate to the use of property but
each protects a different interest so a use which fully complies with a zoning ordinance
or is exempt from a zoning ordinance may still be enjoined as a nuisance." Id. at 613, 440
N.Y.S.2d at 824.
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egate the municipality to a less certain, more cumbersome pro-
cedure which was never intended to supplant rational planning
or traditional zoning implementation and enforcement. The
community and the neighborhood should not be required to ab-
sorb the consequences solely because a school district desires "to
lease property to the lessee offering the 'most benefit' to the dis-
trict."26 6 When a school district seeks to maximize its profit de-
rived from renting surplus school buildings to commercial con-
cerns, local zoning regulations should control in order to protect
the community's residential neighborhoods and the integrity of
its zoning scheme. Requiring a school district to seek a use vari-
ance if it desires to utilize unneeded buildings for an impermis-
sible zoning use would require it to demonstrate both an inabil-
ity to sell or lease the structure for a permitted use and the fact
that the proposed use would not alter the essential character of
the neighborhood.2 67 By subjecting a school district to local zon-
ing regulations in such instances and requiring the same demon-
stration which all applicants for a use variance must make, the
interests of the school district and of the neighborhood may be
evaluated and, if appropriate, accommodated, mitigated, or
limited.
B. Private and Parochial Schools
Since no difference exists in the promotion of the general
welfare of a community between public and private educational
institutions, both must be treated equally and on the same ba-
sis. 2 ' s The court of appeals has noted that "the cases apparently
266. Id. at 613, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
267. Foster v. Saylor, 85 A.D.2d at 876, 877-78, 447 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (4th Dep't
1981). As the Foster decision demonstrates, proof of a school district's economic and
demographic plight, its inability to lease unutilized school property in conformity with
the zoning law for an amount sufficient to meet its debt service on the property, its
inability to sell the property for a permitted use, the fact that the hardship is due to the
unique nature of the property, and the fact that the proposed variant use will not alter
the essential character of the neighborhood, may entitle it to a use variance for unneeded
school space. Id.
268. Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d at 522, 136 N.E.2d at 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 859
("An ordinance will also be stricken if it attempts to exclude private or parochial schools
from any residential area where public schools are permitted."). See Rockefeller v.
Pynchon, 41 Misc. 2d 1, 3, 244 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963) (nurs-
ery school); Brandeis School v. Village of Lawrence, 18 Misc. 2d 550, 558-59, 184
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draw no distinction between public and private education uses, a
distinction which might offend constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection."26 Since the public policy of pro-
moting the educationi of the state's youth remains equally strong
and is advanced to the same extent by private schools, the exis-
tence of a profit motive in conducting a private school does not
result in any change in the applicable standards.2 70  Conse-
quently, it has long been held that private schools, like religious
institutions, may not be excluded as a permitted use from resi-
dentially zoned areas.2 71 Similarly, it was held that a fifty-acre
minimum lot area requirement which applied to parochial
schools, but not to public schools, unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated against parochial schools. 2
Unlike the decisions examining the conflict between pur-
ported religious uses and zoning regulations, where the most dif-
ficult task the courts have had to face is determining what uses
constitute a bona fide religious use of property,273 whether a par-
ticular facility is devoted to an educational purpose is usually
N.Y.S.2d 687, 697 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959) (private nonprofit elementary school);
Merrick Community Nursery School v. Young, 11 Misc. 2d 576, 578, 171 N.Y.S.2d 522,
525 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1958) (private nursery school); Hoelzer v. Village of New
Hyde Park, 4 Misc. 2d 96, 98, 150 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956)
(amendment to village ordinance); Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 2
Misc. 2d 309, 311, 123 N.Y.S.2d 716, 719 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1953) (private
college).
269. Le Boutillier, 33 N.Y.2d at 131-32, 305 N.E.2d at 758, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 629
(citations omitted).
270. Village of Brookville v. Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d 790, 794, 200
N.Y.S.2d 126, 133 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960), aff'd, 14 A.D.2d 575, 218 N.Y.S.2d 264
(2d Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 672, 180 N.E.2d 905, 225 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1962). "[T]he
contribution which a private school makes to the public good in educating youngsters, is
rendered nonetheless valid because it earns a profit." 24 Misc. 2d at 794, 200 N.Y.S.2d at
133.
271. See Diocese of Rochester, 1 N.Y.2d at 522, 136 N.E.2d at 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d at
858-59 (nursery school); Brandeis School, 18 Misc. 2d at 559, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 696 (pri-
vate nonprofit elementary school); Merrick Community Nursery School, 11 Misc. 2d at
578, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 525 (private nursery school); Hoelzer, 4 Misc. 2d at 98, 150
N.Y.S.2d at 767 (amendment to village ordinance to include parochial schools in residen-
tial zone).
272. Westbury Hebrew Congregation v. Downer, 59 Misc. 2d 387, 388, 302 N.Y.S.2d
923, 925 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969) (50-acre minimum zoning requirement); Greater
New York Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists v. Miller, 54 Misc. 2d 268, 282 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967) (parochial school and church special exception).
273. Once it is determined that a use qualifies as a church, synagogue, or accessory
function, the court's inquiry, in the past, has been quite limited.
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self-evident. It is for this reason that the factual details of rela-
tively few educational decisions are worthy of extensive discus-
sion. While it is clear that traditional private schools are entitled
to privileged status, the conclusion may be somewhat obtuse
when construing uses such as camps, day care centers, and some
nontraditional uses claimed to be accessory to a valid educa-
tional function. While these uses may have some educational at-
tributes or functions, an analysis of the facts in such unusual
cases is required in order to determine whether the education of
youngsters is legitimately the aim or merely a subterfuge to ob-
tain the more favorable treatment accorded such uses.
The courts have, from time to time, endeavored to fashion a
comprehensive definition of "school" for zoning purposes. The
"prime requisites" of a school, for example, have been deter-
mined to consist of: a curriculum, adequate physical facilities to
conduct its educational function, and a staff qualified to imple-
ment its educational objectives. 274 An educational institution has
also been defined as an organization which has an objective with
educational value, performs some educational function and is or-
ganized exclusively for that purpose.275 While such conventional
definitions are easily applicable to traditional educational insti-
tutions, they are clearly inadequate for construing more unor-
thodox uses claimed to serve an educational function. In such
unusual circumstances, simple definitions fail and the institu-
tion's programs, facilities, and goals must be examined to unveil
the paramount purpose of the sponsor. Elementary schools and
high schools, for example, are clearly entitled to the benefit of
such preferential treatment.2 76 Similarly, colleges and universi-
274. Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d at 792, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 131. See also Rorie
v. Woodmere Academy, 52 N.Y.2d 200, 205, 418 N.E.2d 659, 661, 437 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68
(1981). Other definitions implicitly approved by a New York court include: "'a place
where instruction is imparted to the young' "; "'any place or means of discipline, im-
provement, instruction, or training' "; "'the union of all elements in the organization, to
furnish education in some branch of learning - the arts or sciences or literature.' "
Schweizer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 8 Misc. 2d 878, 879-80, 167 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1957) (citations omitted).
275. Imbergamo v. Barclay, 77 Misc. 2d 188, 191, 352 N.Y.S.2d 337, 341 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1973). Also considered to be significant by the court in concluding that
an art league was a school, was the employment of a full-time staff of instructors for the
purpose of conducting art classes. Id. at 192, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
276. See Brandeis School, 18 Misc. 2d 550, 184 N.Y.S.2d 687.
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ties promote the welfare of the community at large, 7 although
such institutions may primarily serve residents of other
communities.7 8
With the growing trend of career and working mothers,
nursery schools and day care centers have become an essential
fixture in most communities. While it has been observed that
"[it] is obvious that the same standard cannot be used to mea-
sure what constitutes a grade or secondary school as a pregrade
school because of the capacity of the pupils at the different
levels, 21 7 9 the courts have held that day care centers, preschool
programs, and nursery schools satisfy the criteria as "educa-
tional" institutions. 80 The state legislature has also recognized
the desirability of the promotion of such "schools" and has
unambiguously declared a strong legislative policy favoring the
establishment of day care centers.81
277. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (special
permit to expand operations); Le Boutillier, 33 N.Y.2d at 131, 305 N.E.2d at 758, 350
N.Y.S.2d at 629 (special use permit for college); Long Island Univ. v. Tappan, 202 Misc.
956, 113 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1952), aff'd, 281 A.D. 771, 118 N.Y.S.2d
767 (2d Dep't 1953), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 893, 114 N.E.2d 432, reh'g denied, 306 N.Y. 570, 115
N.E.2d 680 (1953) (annexation of property).
278. Le Boutillier, 33 N.Y.2d at 131, 305 N.E.2d at 758, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 629 (special
use permit for college). See Hofstra College v. Wilmerding, 24 Misc. 2d 248, 258, 204
N.Y.S.2d 476, 487 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960), appeal dismissed, 12 A.D.2d 631, 210
N.Y.S.2d 791 (2d Dep't 1960) (experimental college).
279. People v. Collins, 191 Misc. 553, 555, 83 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (Westchester
County Ct. 1948).
280. See Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d 978, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970) (day care center); Bernstein v. Board of Appeals, 60
Misc. 2d 470, 302 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969) (nursery school); Rocke-
feller v. Pynchon, 41 Misc. 2d 1, 244 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963) (nurs-
ery school); People v. Collins, 191 Misc. 2d 553, 83 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Westchester County
Ct. 1948) ("preschool"); People v. Bacon, 133 Misc. 2d 771, 508 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1986) (day care center). A day care center "differs from the traditional
nursery school in that it generally accepts infants starting at a much earlier age, operates
for longer hours . . .and tends to serve more of a custodial than an educational func-
tion." RATHKOPF, supra note 25, at § 20.02[7].
281. The state legislature has declared that "[tlhe provision of [day care] facilities is
hereby declared to be a public purpose which it is the policy of the state to encourage,"
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 410-d (McKinney 1983), and "[i]nsofar as the provisions of this
act [Chapter 1013 of the Laws of 1969 enacting or amending N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 410-
d, N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 41(7) (McKinney 1976), and the Youth Facilities Project
Guarantee Fund Act] are inconsistent with the provisions of any other law, general, spe-
cific or local, the provisions of this act shall be controlling." Act of May 26, 1969, ch.
1013, 1969 N.Y. LAWS 1585.
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There is a serious shortage throughout the state of facilities suita-
ble for use for the care of children especially those of pre-school
age and primary school age whose parents are unable to provide
such care for all or a substantial part of the day or post-school
day.... Existing day care ... facilities are overcrowded with long
waiting lists. Many such facilities are so located that they are not
accessible to families in need of such services. The absence of ad-
equate day care .. .facilities is contrary to the interest of the
people of the state, is detrimental to the health and welfare of the
child and his parents and prevents the gainful employment of
persons, who are otherwise qualified, because of the need to pro-
vide such care in their home.2"2
Although this strong policy statement is particularly rele-
vant in concluding that encouraging the establishment of day
care centers certainly promotes the welfare of the community
and that such uses are, accordingly, entitled to some additional
consideration in justice court prosecutions, one court has deter-
mined that such legislation has not pre-empted local zoning reg-
ulation in this area2 " while another has arrived at a contrary
conclusion.28 4 A 1986 amendment to the Social Services Law,28 5
however, eliminated any doubt as to the issue of pre-emption.
As a result of such legislation, a zoning regulation may not pro-
hibit the use of a "single family dwelling for group family day
282. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 410-d (McKinney 1983).
283. People v. Halloran, 130 Misc. 2d 569, 497 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Rockville Centre J. Ct.
1985). In Halloran, the court found that since the purpose of the legislation was to facili-
tate the encouragement of child care facilities, the legislature did not pre-empt the zon-
ing ordinance from prohibiting day care businesses in a residential district. Id. at 571,
497 N.Y.S.2d at 249-50. The court also found that the requirements of the zoning law
were not impermissibly inconsistent with the regulations of the Department of Social
Services. Id. at 572-73, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 250-51.
284. Bacon, 133 Misc. 2d 771, 508 N.Y.S.2d 138. In Bacon, the court determined
that "public policy and the laws of this State require finding that a family day care home
is a permissible use of residentially zoned property." Id. at 776, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 141. The
court determined that an ordinance which is interpreted to prohibit family day care in a
residential zoning district is invalid since it would "conflict with and hinder State law
and policy favoring home day care for children" and would not bear a reasonable or
substantial relation to the public health, safety or welfare. 133 Misc. 2d at 777, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 141. Consequently, since the ordinance did not expressly prohibit day care
centers as an accessory use of residential property, the court concluded that a day care
center was a permissible accessory use. Id. at 777-78, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
285. Act of Aug. 2, 1986, ch. 875, 1986 N.Y. LAws 2155 (amending N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW §§ 390, 390-a, 410, 412, 424-a (McKinney 1983)).
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care" if the Department of Social Services has issued a permit
for such use.28 A "group family day care home" is defined as
a home wherein day care services are provided to up to ten chil-
dren of all ages, including not more than four children under two
years of age or up to twelve children where all of such children
are over two years of age. A group family day care home may
provide day care services to two additional children if such addi-
tional children are of school age and such children only receive
services before or after school hours.28
While the provisions of a zoning law may not bar the utilization
of a residential home for such use, the legislation does not inter-
fere with the ability of a municipality to condition the use of
property as a "group family day care home" on obtaining a spe-
cial permit and the imposition of reasonable conditions which
seek to insure that the use of the premises does not unduly in-
terfere with the residential character of neighboring property.
Moreover, an explicit pre-emption of local zoning authority
does not exist with respect to day care centers which do not sat-
isfy the statutory definition. While the general legislative policy
of encouraging day care centers is certainly a laudable endeavor,
limiting the establishment of facilities which do not satisfy the
definition of "group family day care home" to appropriate areas
is not inconsistent with the general intent to facilitate such ben-
eficial uses. Rational planning should control in the location of
such facilities in order to protect the neighborhood from poten-
tially instrusive effects and to safeguard the children utilizing
such centers. While the courts remained divided in this matter,
it would appear that those enterprises may be prohibited in resi-
dential areas and, without question, may be conditioned upon
obtaining a special permit.
In recognition of the potentially disturbing consequences of
day care centers and nursery schools on residential neighbor-
hoods, the courts have sanctioned a requirement that nursery
286. See N.Y. Soc. SEEv. LAW § 390 (13)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1988). The amend-
ment also precludes the prohibition of the use of the following premises for "group fam-
ily day care" if the Department has issued a permit therefore and the use is otherwise
permitted under the New York Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code: any multi-
ple dwelling classified as fireproof or a dwelling unit located on the ground floor of a
multiple dwelling not classified as fireproof.
287. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 390 (13)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
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schools obtain a special permit as a prerequisite to their opera-
tion while elementary schools and high schools are uses permit-
ted by right.288 In reviewing such an application, it has been held
that a board did not act unreasonably in denying a special per-
mit for a substandard sized lot and determining that the use of
the property for a nursery school would merely constitute an im-
permissible accessory use to a private dwelling.8
The court of appeals has interpreted the mandate of the
New York State Constitution that the "legislature shall provide
for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of this state may be edu-
cated,"290 to include "the duty to establish 'schools for physically
or mentally handicapped or delinquent children .... , ,,211 "The
State has an obligation to raise these [handicapped] children to
greater mental and emotional stature, and to make them, if pos-
sible, normal, useful, happy persons, equal to the other millions
of children whom it trains every year. '292 As in the case of public
288. Rockefeller, 41 Misc. 2d at 3, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 981; Merrick Community Nurs-
ery School, 11 Misc. 2d at 576, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 522. It should be noted that these two
decisions pre-date the previously discussed legislation, which has in one instance served
as the basis for a finding that local zoning regulations are pre-empted with respect to day
care centers, as defined in the Social Services Law and regulations.
289. Rockefeller, 41 Misc. 2d at 5, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 983. "lIt is certainly within the
'appropriate restrictions' reserved to the board by the Rochester case to require such a
school to be located on an improved plot dedicated exclusively to the function of educa-
tion, rather than an accessory use to a private single-family residence." Id.
290. N.Y. CONST. art XI, § 1 (emphasis added).
291. Wiltwyck School for Boys v. Hill, 11 N.Y.2d 182, 191, 182 N.E.2d 268, 272, 227
N.Y.S.2d 655, 660 (1962) (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2554(9), (18)).
292. Brent v. Hoch, 25 Misc. 2d 1062, 1066, 205 N.Y.S.2d 66, 71 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1960), aff'd, 13 A.D.2d 505, 211 N.Y.S.2d 853 (2d Dep't 1961). Cf. Brandt v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 90 Misc. 2d 31, 393 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1977), aff'd, 61 A.D.2d 1012, 402 N.Y.S.2d 974 (2d Dep't 1978). In Brandt, the court held
that a school for mentally retarded individuals did not qualify under the definition of
"school" contained in a zoning ordinance which characterized a "private school" as a
"kindergarten, primary or secondary school furnishing a comprehensive curriculum of
academic instruction." 90 Misc. 2d at 33, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 265. Although it was intended
to provide care, treatment, training, and education for severely to moderately mentally
retarded persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five, the court concluded
that the aims and programs of the facility "certainly do not in any way, shape or form
comply with the limited definition of private school contained in the zoning ordinance."
Id. at 33, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 266. This decision is certainly contrary to the rationale and
general philosophy of other decisions in this area. It would appear that a potential basis
for this contrary holding is the presence, in the court's apparent view, of a predominance
of psychiatric and medical diagnosis, treatment, and counselling in the program.
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educational institutions, the bases for the special treatment ac-
corded schools that educate such youth is two-fold: they are
clearly furthering the welfare of the state and community by
providing education for the state's youth, be they handicapped,
delinquent, or otherwise, and secondly, they are performing an
imperative state function.29 Similarly, the furnishing of care to
mentally handicapped children and the providing of schooling
while the children were in residence at the institution were con-
sidered by the court of appeals to be educational functions.29"' As
a result of this strong state policy favoring the education of such
disadvantaged children, municipal attempts to distinguish such
institutions from traditional public and private schools have
largely been unsuccessful.2 9 5
The criterion as to what constitutes a school is, perhaps,
best elucidated when a distinction is attempted between a sum-
mer "school" which qualifies as a true educational institution
and a summer "camp" which does not.296 In reviewing the issue,
the court of appeals has opined that "[t]he question . . .is ...
how far a private school summer program may deviate from its
September to June curriculum before it functions not as a pri-
vate school but as a day camp and, therefore, beyond what the
293. Such institutions are "actually performing functions belonging to the State and
with which the State is vitally concerned - education of and related aid to delinquent,
neglected and dependent children." Wiltwyck School for Boys, 11 N.Y.2d at 192, 182
N.E.2d at 272, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61.
294. Rogers v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 308 N.Y. 126, 132, 123
N.E.2d 806, 809 (1954). A home for children suffering from cardiac problems with an
accessory school which was a prior nonconforming use was converted into a school and
home for mentally handicapped children. Id. at 130-31, 123 N.E.2d at 809. The court of
appeals held that the school qualified as a continuation of the nonconforming use under
an ordinance provision which permitted the continuation of a nonconforming use in spite
of a change in ownership or tenancy, if the use is identical with the initial nonconforming
use. Id. at 132-33, 123 N.E.2d at 809.
295.
[T]he notion of what constitutes a school must be extended to include an institu-
tion for the care and education of retarded or delinquent children. And it must be
assumed that the power of a municipality to regulate or exclude such institutions
is limited by the same factors of public welfare as are relevant in the case of edu-
cational uses generally.
1 R.M. ANDERSON, supra note 239, at § 11.16.
296. "The line between education and recreation is one narrow and difficult of defi-
nition." Margo Operating Corp. v. Village of Great Neck, 129 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1954).
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zoning ordinance allows. ' 297 A key factor in deciding the issue is
"whether a substantial part of the summer program is devoted
to subjects which are also part of the regular school curricu-
lum."2 9 The fact that some activities may also be found in the
program of a day camp is not dispositive since
[w]hat is essential is that the educational component of the pro-
gram, the staff and the plant be of sufficient size to warrant the
conclusion that the program involves a good faith effort on the
part of the private school to accomplish serious educational aims
and is not simply a fun and games recreational program in
disguise.299
Although the concept of an educational use does not include ac-
tivities which are primarily recreational in nature, 00 the pres-
ence of recreational and physical activities does not require the
conclusion that a program is merely a camp since physical train-
ing may clearly constitute a portion of an educational pro-
gram.3"' Particularly when the program is designed for physi-
cally or mentally handicapped children or adults, the physical
activities may be an integral part of the education and training
of those attending.302 Ordinarily, however, if the primary activi-
ties offered by a camp are nonacademic activities and the teach-
ing of academic subjects is unavailable or constitutes an insignif-
icant portion of the activities, the conclusion is evident that the
program is a summer camp and not a school.303
Among the more unusual uses that have been accorded pref-
erential treatment is an art league which intended to conduct art
classes and run art exhibits.3 04 A conference center and dormito-
297. Rorie, 52 N.Y.2d at 205, 418 N.E.2d at 661, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
298. Id. See also Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d at 792, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
299. Rorie, 52 N.Y.2d at 206, 418 N.E.2d at 662, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
300. Village of Asharoken v. Pitassy, 119 A.D.2d 404, 412, 507 N.Y.S.2d 164, 170 (2d
Dep't 1986). See Schoen v. Bowne, 273 A.D. 1020, 79 N.Y.S.2d 292 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd,
298 N.Y. 611, 81 N.E.2d 350 (1948).
301. "Supervised physical training and instruction by competent personnel is none-
theless educational because it trains the body as well as the mind." Paulgene Realty
Corp., 24 Misc. 2d at 792, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
302. See Summit School v. Neugent, 82 A.D.2d 463, 470, 442 N.Y.S.2d 73, 79 (2d
Dep't 1981).
303. See Fremed v. Bayswater Park, Inc., 11 Misc. 2d 1017, 176 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1958).
304. See Imbergano, 77 Misc. 2d 188, 352 N.Y.S.2d 337.
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ries for attendees from business and educational institutions
might, depending on the facts, be considered an educational
use.30 5 In reviewing a proposed use, it is irrelevant that the spon-
soring organization is not approved by the State Board of Re-
gents 06 or registered pursuant to the requirements of the Edu-
cation Law,307 since it is the function and objective of the
organization and use that dictates its treatment. Moreover, an
occasional profit-making bazaar or art sale does not transform
such a use into a commercial venture.30 8
Since schools are afforded a privileged position in zoning re-
view, so too, are the accessory uses without which schools could
not continue their operations. Accordingly, it has been deter-
mined that the parking of school buses on the same lot as a
school is a permitted accessory use,30 9 but the same accessory
use of an adjoining parcel is not protected. 310 Similarly, having
permitted a college to become established in a municipality, the
municipality could not limit the number of seats in athletic
stands.1
In order to deal with the inevitable adverse effects of educa-
tional institutions and to mitigate the negative impacts on the
area, the courts have recognized the requirement of a special
permit as an appropriate device to evaluate the potential im-
pacts on the community of a private educational use and to per-
form the delicate balancing of these concerns with promoting
305. Ruckgaber, 65 Misc. 2d at 245, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
306. Imbergano, 77 Misc. 2d at 191, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
307. Collins, 191 Misc. at 552, 83 N.Y.S.2d at 124-25.
308. Imbergano, 77 Misc. 2d at 192, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 341-42.
309. People v. Firestone, 48 Misc. 2d 480, 482, 265 N.Y.S.2d 179, 181 (New Rochelle
City Ct. 1965).
It is difficult to conceive of conducting an academic school which draws its stu-
dents from a widespread area without the use of vehicles to transport them .... It
is true that the ordinance reveals a plan to protect residential areas from commer-
cial use or enterprise, but the legislative intent underlying the statute is not con-
trary either to the use or to the parking of school buses and vehicles. They are
employed solely for school purposes and they constitute an accessory use clearly
within the purview of the ordinance.
Id.
310. People v. Zelden, 60 Misc. 2d 18, 300 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1969).
311. Property Owners Ass'n, 2 Misc. 2d 309, 123 N.Y.S.2d 716.
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education of the public.3" 2 In imposing conditions upon the es-
tablishment or expansion of an educational institution, as with
any use, the conditions must be directly related and incidental
to the proposed use of the property and not the manner of oper-
ation of the particular enterprise. 13 As a result, it is beyond the
authority conferred on a municipality to impose, as a condition
of a special permit for a private school, the details of the opera-
tion of the educational processes of the institution.314 Conditions
which relate to the age of students, limit instruction to certain
grades, and limit the hours of operation of a school are invalid
"because they apply to the details of the operation of the busi-
ness and not to the zoning use of the [property]. ' 3 '
Summit School v. Neugent,31 a for example, illustrates the
impermissibility of the imposition of conditions unrelated to the
use of the land. In Summit School, the applicant applied for and
received a special permit and variance to operate a private
school for handicapped children with learning disabilities, sub-
ject to a number of conditions.3 17 After a subsequent hearing,
the zoning board of appeals found that the school had violated a
number of the "conditions subsequent" and revoked the vari-
ance and special permit. 318 In the special proceeding in which
the revocation of the permit was challenged, the court found
312. The majority of the more recent decisions deal with the authority or reasona-
bleness of conditions attached to a special permit. Since "[miunicipal zoning ordinances
usually do not undertake to regulate schools ... the decisions dealing with the power to
regulate are few." R.M. ANDERSON, supra note 239, at § 11.09.
313. Summit School, 82 A.D.2d at 467, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 76-77.
314. Id. at 468, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
315. Bernstein, 60 Misc. 2d at 476, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
316. 82 A.D.2d 463, 442 N.Y.S.2d 73 (2d Dep't 1981).
317. Id. at 464, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 75. The conditions were agreed to by the applicant
and were the subject of a written agreement entered into by the parties. In answer to the
claim that the school had waived its right to object to the conditions, the court deter-
mined that, to the extent that the school might "be precluded by a prior waiver of a
statutory or constitutional right to challenge the official action of the municipality in
relation to zoning," such waiver of a statutory or constitutional right to challenge the
action was ineffective to foreclose a challenge where the right concerned a matter of
public policy. Id. at 468, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 77. The court determined that the school had
"waived all objections to the 'conditions subsequent,' except those under which the mu-
nicipality sought to assume control over some aspects of the educational process of the
school, an effort for which [they are] neither professionally equipped nor legally author-
ized to undertake" and which is contrary to public policy. Id. at 468, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
318. Id. at 465, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
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that a condition which limited attendance at the school to those
with learning disabilities under the age of eighteen impermissi-
bly contradicted the Education Law319 which specifically pro-
vides for the education of handicapped children under the age of
twenty-one.2 Such a condition further usurped the educational
function of the local school district which is responsible for de-
termining the nature and extent of a child's handicap and to ed-
ucate the child appropriately.32 1 The board's attempt to limit
the handicapped condition of the children attending the school
was invalid for the same reason.32 2 A condition which limited the
times of the day during which educational classes could be con-
ducted and a provision that athletic and recreational activities
be secondary and be conducted either indoors or sufficiently dis-
tant from the school boundaries were also found to be improper
attempts to control the school's educational process.2
The court also invalidated a condition which prohibited
summer camp or vacation activities at the school property and
limited summer activities to a summer school session which was
required to conform to the same general educational and recrea-
tional requirements as the regular school session:
If, in conjunction with the operation of the school, it is deemed by
those charged with its management that it would enhance the
training and education of the students by a combination of aca-
demic and camp activities by trained members of its faculty or
others with similar educational qualifications, an effort by this
condition to restrict such activities is wholly unauthorized and
constitutes an interference with the teaching function.2 4
Also found to be an improper intrusion on the details of the op-
eration of the school, not relating to the zoning use of the prop-
erty, was the requirement that a certain proportion of staff to
students be maintained.2 5
Similarly, among the impermissible provisions of zoning or-
dinances which sought to regulate schools were area require-
319. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 4401(1), 4402(1)(a) (McKinney 1981).
320. Summit School, 82 A.D.2d at 469, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
321. Id. at 469, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
322. Id. at 471, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
323. Id. at 468-69, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 77-78.
324. Id. at 470, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 79. See supra notes 296-303 and accompanying text.
325. Summit School, 82 A.D.2d at 470, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
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ments per student,326 the requirement of an annually renewable
permit, and the requirement of a six-foot stockade fence where a
school adjoins residential property. 27 Such regulations exceeded
the powers delegated to municipalities and were determined not
to be reasonably related to advancing the stated goal of safety
and fire prevention. 28 Completely beyond the authority of local
municipal control is any review or control of a school's curricu-
lum.3 29 Also considered to be unreasonable per se is an off-street
parking requirement for students without making a provision for
the fact that the school's student population is not of driving
age.330
IV. An Emerging Standard
Although the decisions of the New York courts before
Bagnardi consistently elevated religious (and educational) uses
over virtually every zoning consideration, it has been observed
that "[d]espite First Amendment considerations, the judicial
trend [in the country] now seems to favor the view that churches
may be regulated like any other use of land in a residential
zone." 33' The dissent in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of
the North Shore, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Har-
bor,3 2 initially served as the basis for a school of thought which
had advocated that a far less deferential standard was applicable
326. See Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d at 795, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 133 (30 square
feet of classroom and 1,000 square feet of outdoor area per student); Betty-June School
v. Young, 25 Misc. 2d 909, 913, 201 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697-98 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960)
(30 square feet of classroom and 200 square feet of outdoor area per student).
327. See Betty-June School, 25 Misc. 2d at 913-16, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 698-700;
Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d at 797, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 136-37.
328. Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d at 797, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 136-37.
The number of square feet of space allotted to a student might properly be man-
dated as an educational matter as a health, safety or fire regulation ... but what
has that to do with zoning? ...Considered from an educational view the State
might very well prescribe the minimum space standards for students, but it has
not seen fit to do so, but neither has it conferred control of educational functions
on plaintiff village.
Id. at 795, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 133-34.
329. Westbury Hebrew Congregation, 59 Misc. 2d at 389, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
330. Paulgene Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d at 796, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
331. 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 25, at § 20.01[2][a] n.9.
332. 38 N.Y.2d 283, 292, 342 N.E.2d 534, 541, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 757 (1975) (Jones,
J., dissenting). Judge Jasen joined in this dissent.
[Vol. 8:1
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss1/1
ZONING REG ULA TIONS
in New York. The planning concerns and rationale expressed by
the dissent in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue have, to a
great degree, been accepted in Bagnardi. No longer does an in-
surmountable presumption exist that the desires of all religious
and educational institutions to establish or expand a religious
use always outweigh legitimate municipal planning and safety
concerns.
The Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue dissent opined
that "[i]n our view New York should approach the position
taken by the growing number of States holding what has been
termed the minority view."3 33 Noting that the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of worship are not always absolutist and
invariable,33 the two dissenting judges observed that the func-
tional aspects of religious uses "are no different from those of
other places of community assembly and activity. 3 35 The dis-
sent criticized past judicial preoccupation with the status and
characteristics of the religious users rather than the functional
aspects of the religious use. 3 As was eventually accepted in
Bagnardi, the dissent asserted that "[i]t cannot be successfully
contended . . . that the application of sensitively, minimally
designed regulation of religious and educational uses would ma-
terially adversely affect the full and free exercise of religious or
educational freedom. 337
Given the reasonable expectation that the use of the prem-
ises as a synagogue would increase traffic and create parking
problems, the dissenters in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue
found no constitutional considerations which precluded the ap-
plication of what they perceived as the reasonable provisions of
333. Id. at 292, 342 N.E.2d at 541, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
334. Id. at 293, 342 N.E.2d at 542, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
335. Id. at 294, 342 N.E.2d at 542, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
336. Id. at 294, 342 N.E.2d at 542, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
[W]e do not agree that because of the merits of these [church] activities it can be
said that an infringement of the constitutional rights of the owner results if it is
not allowed use of the property for such purposes in the midst of a section of the
city which has been restricted .... primarily to homes to be occupied by individ-
ual families.
Id. (quoting Miami Beach Lutheran Church v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d 880, 882
(Fla. 1955)).
337. Id. at 294, 342 N.E.2d at 542, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
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the zoning law to the property.33 8 The dissent noted that
[i]t is a newcomer which purchased the property . . . with full
awareness of the regulatory provisions of the local zoning ordi-
nance which had predated the synagogue's interest in the prop-
erty by 20 years. Beyond that this synagogue comes not to serve
the religious or other needs of the residents of Roslyn Harbor but
of members of its own congregation from nearby municipalities. 3"
The dissent discerned a reasonable relationship between the
zoning regulation and the public health, safety, and welfare of
the community and found that "the application of such regula-
tion would not infringe upon the legitimate interests of ... [the]
synagogue. ' 340 The dissenters concluded that "[t]he time has
come when our court should forthrightly face the legal, economic
and social implications of continued slavish adherence to the
outmoded doctrine that churches and synagogues are wholly im-
mune from even reasonable zoning regulations."'34 1
The dissent was joined in part by the concurrence of two
other judges. 2 The concurring opinion agreed with
so much of the dissent as characterizes the majority expression of
the law as too absolutist in providing a preference and even to
some extent an immunity from significant zoning regulation for
premises devoted to religious uses .... Fundamentally, the law
should move in the direction of requiring even religious institu-
tions to accommodate to factors directly relevant to public health,
safety, or welfare, inclusive of fire and similar emergency risks,
and traffic conditions insofar as they involve public safety. 343
It was "[t]he all but conclusive presumption that considerations
of public health, safety, and welfare are always outweighed ...
by the policy favoring religious structures" that the concurring
opinion found to be objectionable. 4  The concurring judges,
however, sought to annul the denial of the permit since the ef-
fect and purpose of the provisions of the municipality's zoning
338. Id. at 295, 342 N.E.2d at 543, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
339. Id. at 294, 342 N.E.2d at 542-43, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
340. Id. at 295, 342 N.E.2d at 543, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
341. Id. at 295, 342 N.E.2d at 543, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 759-60.
342. Id. at 291-92, 342 N.E.2d at 540-41, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 756-57 (Breitel, J., concur-
ring). Judge Wachtler joined in the concurrence.
343. Id. at 291-92, 342 N.E.2d at 540-41, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
344. Id. at 292, 342 N.E.2d at 541, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
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ordinance were considered to be exclusionary without compen-
sating values to sustain a public purpose. The overall impact of
the ordinance was determined not to sufficiently accommodate
the priority, "albeit limited, that should be accorded to religious
institutions. 34
5
Subsequently, in a dissenting opinion in American Friends
of the Society of St. Pius v. Schwab,3 46 it was suggested that
a close scrutiny of the concurring and dissenting opinions in
[Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue] indicates that a majority
of the Court of Appeals has moved toward the view that there are
legitimate and serious considerations of public health, safety and
welfare, i.e., fire and similar emergency risks, and traffic condi-
tions insofar as they involve public safety, which outweigh any
policy favoring religious structures. 347
In Society of St. Pius, the church sought site plan approval
to convert a house located in a residential zone into a rectory
and chapel seating 250 people. 48 The property was located on a
cul-de-sac, approximately 2,200 feet from the nearest public
highway and would only be accessible by traveling on private
highways. 49 The board found that a fire hazard would exist as
the result of the inadequate parking facilities, ingress only on
narrow private roads, the location at the end of a dead end
street, and traffic generated prior to and following services. 5
The majority decision annulled the denial of the permit and re-
mitted the application for the imposition of conditions which
would permit the establishment of the church while mitigating
any adverse impacts. 51 The majority also held that "[u]ntil the
appellants attempt to establish such reasonable conditions, it is
premature to deal with the issue raised by the dissent, which is
whether the petitioner's right to use its property for church pur-
poses must be implemented even if it develops that it is impossi-
345. Id. at 292, 342 N.E.2d at 541, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
346. 68 A.D.2d 646, 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d 991, 994 (2d Dep't 1979) (Suozzi, J.,
dissenting).
347. Id. at 652, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
348. Id. at 654, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
349. Id. at 655, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
350. Id. at 655, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
351. Society of St. Pius, 68 A.D.2d at 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
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ble to fashion reasonable conditions. 3 52 The dissent, on the
other hand, was of the opinion that Westchester Reform Temple
was no longer controlling and that the dissenting and concurring
opinions in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue constitute the
prevailing rule today in the court of appeals. 53
Having rebuffed years of municipal attempts at regulation
of churches and schools and efforts to minimize undesirable ef-
fects of such uses, the court of appeals was provided the oppor-
tunity to re-examine the law as it affects such socially beneficial
uses for the first time in more than ten years in Cornell Univer-
sity v. Bagnardi.354 The appellate division, third department,
determined that a city of Ithaca zoning ordinance was invalid
insofar as it excluded the proposed expansion of a Cornell Uni-
versity educational use into a residential area of the city by re-
quiring a variance for such use and conditioning the issuance of
the variance upon a showing of hardship. 355 The one-family resi-
dential zone in which the property was located permitted public
and parochial schools as uses by right, but required a special
permit from the board of zoning appeals for private schools. 5
The zoning ordinance defined a "school" as a public or private
school below the college level.3 57 As a result, the city required
the university to apply for a variance, the university was unable
to establish "hardship," and the application was denied.3 5 The
court determined that the practical effect of the zoning ordi-
nance was to exclude the educational use of the property and
that the ordinance was thus unreasonable to the extent that it
resulted in such an exclusion. 359 Furthermore, the court held
that "since educational use is [by its nature] harmonious with
the public interest, conditioning such a use upon a showing of
hardship does not bear a substantial relation to public health,
safety, morals or general welfare."3 60
352. Id.
353. Id. at 656, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
354. 68 N.Y.2d 583, 503 N.E.2d 509, 510 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1986).
355. 107 A.D.2d 398, 399, 486 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (3d Dep't 1985).
356. Id. at 399, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 399, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
359. Id. at 400, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
360. Id. at 401, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
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Although, as the dissent noted, the city of Ithaca contains
parts of two college campuses which occupy a substantial por-
tion of the city's area, and the city was not practicing exclusion-
ary or insular zoning,"'1 the majority decision held that, absent
proof of a reasonable and substantial basis for denial of the spe-
cial permit, the city must permit expansion of the university
into its previously residential areas, together with a proliferation
of associated educational activities."' While the majority ac-
corded scant weight to the city's attempts to limit the expansion
of university uses into residential areas,36 3 the dissent reflected a
belief that the city's master plan designation of the area as resi-
dential was a legitimate exercise of the police power "to conserve
the value of buildings and enhance the value and appearance of
land throughout the City."3 "
The court of appeals modified the decision of the third de-
partment, finding that while the protection provided to religious
and educational uses by prior court of appeals decisions was nec-
essary to protect such institutions from community hostility,6 5
those decisions were not intended to entitle all religious and
educational institutions to a "full exemption" from zoning regu-
lations "no matter how offensive, overpowering or unsafe to a
residential neighborhood the use might be."3 6 The court noted
that although they had rejected any conclusive presumption of
an entitlement to an exemption from zoning ordinances in Dio-
cese of Rochester, 67 they had explicitly rejected any argument
that "appropriate restrictions may never be imposed with re-
spect to a church and school and accessory uses" or that "under
no circumstances may [such uses] ever be excluded from desig-
nated areas." 8s Additionally, the court stated that its determi-
361. Id. at 406, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 971 (Kane, J., dissenting).
362. Bagnardi, 107 A.D.2d at 402, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
363. Id. at 401, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
364. Id. at 404, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (Kane, J., dissenting) (quoting ITHACA, N.Y.,
ZONING ORDINANCE § 30.2).
365. Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 593, 503 N.E.2d 509, 513, 510
N.Y.S.2d 861, 865 (1986).
366. Id. at 594, 503 N.E.2d at 514, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 866. "Such an interpretation...
is mandated neither by the case law of our State nor common sense." Id.
367. 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
368. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 594, 503 N.E.2d at 514, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (quoting
Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526, 136 N.E.2d 827, 837, 154
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nation in New York Institute of Technology v. Le Boutillier6 9
that
ordinarily the factors bearing on public health, safety and welfare
such as traffic hazards, impairment of the use, enjoyment or value
of properties in surrounding areas and deterioration of appear-
ance of an area, would not be weighty enough to foreclose an edu-
cational use in a residential area;... [the court] did not intend to
establish a rigid rule that educational or religious uses may never
properly be found to conflict with these factors to such an extent
as to endanger the public's health, safety, welfare or morals . 7 0
Instead, the controlling consideration must be the overall
impact of the use on the public welfare. 7' In spite of the pre-
sumed beneficial effect of churches and schools on the commu-
nity, numerous instances exist in which such an institution may
detract from the public health, safety, and welfare and, as a re-
sult, the court determined, an application for such a use may
properly be denied.7 2 The court of appeals proclaimed that
"[t]here is simply no conclusive presumption that any religious
or educational use automatically outweighs its ill effects.' 7 3 The
routinely presumed beneficial effect of such institutions may be
overcome with evidence of a significant impact on traffic conges-
tion, property values, municipal services, or similar planning
concerns.7 4 Consequently, an educational or religious use which
would "unarguably" be contrary to the public welfare need not
be permitted at all.375 Church and school uses which present
such deleterious consequences on the welfare of the citizens of a
community are clearly not what the court had in mind when, in
Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, it stated that traffic and
similar problems are outweighed by the beneficial effects of a
N.Y.S.2d 849, 863 (1956)).
369. 33 N.Y.2d 125, 305 N.E.2d 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1973).
370. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 594-95, 503 N.E.2d at 514-15, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 866-67.
371. Id. at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
372. Id.
373. Id. (citing Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, 38 N.Y.2d at 292, 342 N.E.2d
at 541, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 756 (Breitel, C.J., concurring)).
374. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
375. Id. The court posed as an example: "A community that resides in close proxim-
ity to a college should not be obliged to stand helpless in the face of proposed uses which
are dangerous to the surrounding area." Id.
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school or church.3 7 6 Quoting the concurring opinion of Chief
Judge Breitel in Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, the court
declared that "even religious [and educational] institutions
[must] accommodate to factors directly relevant to public
health, safety or welfare, inclusive of fire and similar emergency
risks, and traffic conditions insofar as they involve public
safety. 3 7 7
A more balanced approach, however, is required for uses
which, although not dangerous or clearly contrary to the public
welfare, are nonetheless obnoxious to the residents of the neigh-
borhood. 37 Accordingly, a special permit may be required as a
prerequisite to the establishment or expansion of a school or
church, and reasonable conditions may be imposed in order to
minimize the impairment of a residential neighborhood or the
danger of traffic hazards to the same extent as they may be im-
posed on ordinary commercial enterprises . 9 A special permit
for such socially beneficial uses "may be conditioned on the ef-
fect the use would have on traffic congestion, property values,
municipal services, the general plan for development of the com-
munity," and other relevant planning concerns. 80 If such condi-
tions are reasonably designed to counteract the adverse effects
of such use, they will be sustained, "provided they do not by
their cost, magnitude or volume, operate indirectly to exclude
such uses altogether."381
The court of appeals further found to be invalid a require-
ment that an application for a religious or educational use
demonstrate a need for the proposed expansion or a need to ex-
pand at a particular location since such requirements are en-
tirely unrelated to the welfare of the community.3 82 In addition,
376. Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 496-97, 239 N.E.2d 891,
896, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 304 (1968).
377. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (quoting
Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, 38 N.Y.2d at 291-92, 342 N.E.2d at 540-41, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 756 (Breitel, C.J., concurring)).
378. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 595-96, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
379. Id. at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 515, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
380. Id. at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 515-16, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 867-68.
381. Id. at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 516, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 868. But cf. Westchester Reform
Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
382. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 596-97, 503 N.E.2d at 516, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 868. Contra
New York Inst. of Technology v. Le Boutillier, 33 N.Y.2d 125, 305 N.E.2d 754, 350
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a requirement that a church or school demonstrate that no ill
effects will result from the proposal is invalid since it ignores
that such uses "have inherent beneficial effects that must be
weighed against their potential for harming the community.
383
V. Conclusion
A less deferential standard is clearly applicable in balancing
the needs of religious and educational institutions seeking to lo-
cate or expand in residential neighborhoods. While the preemi-
nent status of truly religious and educational uses has not been
significiantly curtailed, it may be argued that all uses operated
or sponsored by a religious or educational organization should
not be entitled to the same level of immunity from zoning regu-
lations. Some may question whether, for example, the drug
center in Slevin is the type of use which must be accommodated
in a residential area solely because a church is a sponsor of the
program and it is operated in a church-owned building. Must a
residential area tolerate whatever use a school district seeks to
install in an unused school building, merely because the district
desires to maximize its return? Should the establishment of a
hospital or factory in a residential zone be mandated merely be-
cause it is owned and operated by a religious organization? Most
likely, such uses are not required to be accommodated. Although
the line has not been well established by current case law, it
generally appears that only those uses which have been truly
recognized as traditional, religious or educational uses and
clearly accessory uses should be accorded such preferred status.
It has been suggested that more emphasis should be placed on
the nature of the use, rather than the organization sponsoring
the use. The argument of those who assert such a limitation is
not illogical. Since the residential neighbors of such uses are re-
quired to cope with any intrusive effects, the organization oper-
ating such nontraditional religious or educational uses should be
required either to mitigate against undesirable impacts to the
same extent as a commercial enterprise or be barred from resi-
N.Y.S.2d 623 (1973). But see Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 597, 503 N.E.2d at 516, 510
N.Y.S.2d at 868 (To the extent that Le Boutillier "may be construed otherwise, it should
not be followed.").
383. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d at 597, 503 N.E.2d at 516, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
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dential areas.
Even the status of traditional religious and educational uses
has been challenged. The court of appeals in Bagnardi has re-
quired religious and educational uses to comply with appropriate
regulations and conditions which would mitigate the negative
impacts of such uses to the same extent as any other use which
interferes with the quiet enjoyment of a residential neighbor-
hood. In effect, the onus of preserving the tranquility of the
neighborhood has been shifted to the institution. Nevertheless,
the privileged position of such socially beneficial institutions in
New York remains well established. Although Bagnardi repre-
sents a realization that such uses produce undesirable impacts
which must be dealt with, the rule remains one, primarily, of
accommodation.
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